Safeguards intended to ensure that military spending decisions are based on security needs rather than corporate lobbying are in place in the UK and EU, but they are widely considered to be weak and ineffective.

The defense industry's influence is often deeply embedded in the policymaking process, making it difficult to separate commercial interests from genuine security requirements.

1. The UK's Flawed Safeguards

The UK's system for defense procurement and spending is criticized for lacking robust safeguards against corporate lobbying. The primary mechanisms are often circumvented or are simply too weak to withstand the industry's influence.

• Weak Transparency Laws: The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 is the UK's central law on lobbying. However, it only requires consultant lobbyists (third-party firms) to register, explicitly excluding in-house lobbyists who work directly for major defense companies. This significant loophole means that the vast majority of lobbying by giants like BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce is not publicly disclosed. Without this transparency, it's impossible for the public to scrutinize who is meeting with whom and what is being discussed.

• The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA): This committee is responsible for regulating the "revolving door," where former government ministers and senior civil servants take jobs in the private sector. The intended safeguard is to prevent a conflict of interest, but ACOBA's advice is not legally binding. A former official can ignore its recommendations for a "cooling-off" period with no penalty. This allows individuals to leverage their insider knowledge and networks for private gain, a powerful form of lobbying that is not subject to effective oversight.

• The Single-Source Procurement Model: A large portion of UK defense spending is done through non-competitive, single-source contracts. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) argues this is necessary for complex, highly specialized projects. However, critics contend that this model leaves the procurement process susceptible to behind-the-scenes lobbying and influence from favored contractors. There is no open competition to drive down prices or ensure value for money, and the decision-making process is largely opaque.

2. The EU's Emerging but Imperfect Safeguards

The EU has been attempting to develop more rigorous safeguards as it increases its role in defense. However, these are still in their early stages and face significant challenges from industry lobbying.

• The EU Transparency Register: This register is a step forward, requiring lobbyists to disclose their budgets and interests. Key officials and politicians are also required to publish meeting records. For example, defense companies seeking a share of the European Defence Fund (EDF) have to be on the register to meet with top EU officials. This provides a valuable, though often incomplete, public record.

• "Conflict of Interest" Rules: The EU has rules to prevent conflicts of interest within its institutions and to manage the "revolving door" for former officials. However, like the UK's system, these rules have been criticized for their lack of strict enforcement and for relying on the goodwill of the former official.

• European Defence Fund (EDF): The EDF is the EU's primary financial tool to support defense R&D. It is intended to foster competition and reduce fragmentation. However, the initial design of the fund was heavily influenced by the very companies that would benefit from it. Industry representatives were a dominant voice on the advisory groups that helped shape the fund's rules, ensuring the priorities aligned with their commercial interests.

• The Lack of a Central Strategy: A key vulnerability in the EU's system is the absence of a comprehensive, threat-based security assessment to guide spending decisions. This vacuum is often filled by the defense industry, which uses the concept of "capability gaps" to justify the need for new, expensive equipment. This approach risks making spending decisions that are driven by the availability of products rather than a clear strategic need. .

3. Alternative and Non-Governmental Safeguards

Given the limitations of official government safeguards, external actors play a crucial role in providing accountability.

• Parliamentary and Committee Scrutiny: Parliamentary committees in both the UK and the EU can hold inquiries and question ministers and officials about defense spending. Their public hearings and reports can bring attention to potential conflicts of interest and flawed procurement decisions. However, a key limitation is that these committees often lack the financial and human resources to conduct deep, independent investigations.

• Investigative Journalism and Watchdog Groups: Independent media and non-governmental organizations like the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) and Transparency International are often the most effective watchdogs. They analyze what limited data is available, expose conflicts of interest, and publish reports that shine a light on the opaque nature of defense lobbying. Their work is a crucial check on power, as it can generate public pressure and force governments to respond.

• Public and Academic Debate: Public debate and academic research on defense spending, national security, and industrial policy are vital for ensuring that a diverse range of voices informs the discussion. This helps to counter the dominant narrative of the defense industry and provides alternative perspectives on how security can be achieved without simply increasing military spending.