Lebanon’s gamble to disarm Hezbollah has led some to question if the Lebanese state can survive such a move, or whether it will collapse back into civil war.

On Friday, September 5, Lebanon’s cabinet endorsed the army’s long-anticipated plan to disarm Hezbollah, a move described as unprecedented but fraught with risk. The three-hour session in Baabda was marked by drama when five Shiite ministers representing Hezbollah, Amal, and allied factions staged a walkout as Army Commander Gen. Rodolphe Haykal presented the proposal. Labor Minister Mohammad Haidar later explained that their withdrawal was a protest against what they saw as a decision forced by Washington.

Although the government has kept the plan’s contents confidential, leaks and disclosed information have revealed its main outlines. The process is divided into five stages, starting with a three-month phase south of the Litani River where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would assume exclusive control of weapons and block transfers. This model would then expand nationwide, supported by measures to secure the Lebanese-Syrian border against arms smuggling and continue disarming Palestinian factions and other armed groups in refugee camps. Monthly reports to the cabinet are required, though the army’s limited resources and Israel’s ongoing strikes, combined with its occupation of five southern positions, threaten progress. Though the cabinet did not approve a timeline, US officials have pressed for a faster timeline than the army’s proposed 15 months, underscoring the international stakes.

The disarmament initiative comes at a pivotal moment. On August 26, US Middle East envoy Tom Barrack announced that the LAF would soon unveil this very plan, following a cabinet vote and under pressure to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701. Newly elected President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam see this as a chance to restore state sovereignty. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem, however, has so far outright rejected the demands, threatening to resist with force.

Since the end of Lebanon’s civil war in 1990, weak institutions and entrenched sectarian divides have enabled Hezbollah to build parallel political, social, and military networks, undermining the state’s authority, especially along the southern border with Israel. The 2023 Hamas attacks and the 2024-2025 Hezbollah-Israel war devastated southern Lebanon, displacing tens of thousands and killing several senior Hezbollah figures, including Hassan Nasrallah.

With Iran weakened by Israeli-American bombings and Assad toppled in Syria, Hezbollah’s position has significantly eroded. However, since the group still earns the trust of the vast majority of the Shia community in Lebanon, how can disarmament happen without plunging the country into another bloody sectarian civil war, one that Hezbollah is already insinuating will happen?

Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces

The challenge of disarming Hezbollah begins within the LAF itself. About one-quarter of its personnel are Shiite Muslims who have remained loyal despite Hezbollah’s conflicts with Israel. Yet orders to act against co-religionists could foster hesitation or sabotage. Integrating Hezbollah fighters into the LAF is equally fraught: incorporating ideologically committed militants into the institution that once opposed them risks undermining its cohesion, unless it’s done gradually through selective recruitment and strict loyalty vetting.

Operationally, the LAF also faces a stark gap. Hezbollah’s extensive, four-decade weapons infrastructure far exceeds the army’s intelligence and resources. Past experience fighting Sunni extremist militias has not prepared the LAF for dismantling such a network independently.

Successful disarmament thus hinges on a credible, modern national military. The LAF, currently around 85,000 strong, must evolve beyond symbolism. Sustained, conditional support from the United States, Europe, and the Gulf states through funding, intelligence sharing, and equipment modernization is essential. Crucially, this support must avoid the perception that the LAF is a US proxy, which could delegitimize the force in Hezbollah’s eyes and among the public, and should instead be framed as strengthening Lebanon’s sovereignty and self-defensive capabilities.

A capable LAF projecting authority, particularly in southern Lebanon, would render Hezbollah’s armed resistance redundant, demonstrating the state’s ability to defend its own sovereignty. Political pressures and alliances with Hezbollah’s traditional allies, such as Amal and the Maronite Free Patriotic Movement, could further incentivize the group to seek influence through politics rather than force.

To enable strengthening the LAF, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), holding 10,500 troops and a $500 million annual budget, which has long maintained a buffer in the south and conducts joint training, should be gradually reduced in favor of LAF deployment, allowing the state to reclaim responsibility for national defense more clearly.

If positioned as a credible, defensive guardian of Lebanon’s territory, the LAF can undermine Hezbollah’s raison d’être for armed operations while retaining Shia trust. A defensive posture also reassures Israel’s security concerns, fostering confidence and the possibility of dialogue with the IDF, as evidenced by its historical openness to cooperation.

Israel’s Role: Ceasefire and Phased Withdrawal

On the other hand, Israel’s restraint is also critical to disarmament success. It must first maintain its ceasefire and immediately halt bombing operations in southern Lebanon. Concurrently, Israel should gradually withdraw from its occupied positions, signaling that Hezbollah’s armed resistance in Lebanon’s south is increasingly unnecessary.

These steps must be synchronized with LAF-led disarmament phases, since Hezbollah will not accept disarmament otherwise. As Israel withdraws, the LAF should initiate phased targeted operations against Hezbollah’s infrastructure. Each Hezbollah demilitarization step should correspond with Israeli concessions, creating a tit-for-tat dynamic. Israel steps back, and Hezbollah’s justification for arms diminishes. In this light, Tom Barrack should also put significant pressure on Israel to take some initial steps.

Proposed Economic Zone in Southern Lebanon

Military and political measures alone cannot disarm Hezbollah. Its power is rooted in socioeconomic influence, particularly as a provider to southern Lebanon’s Shiite communities, and ignoring this risks replacing one instability with another. To address this, the United States should support the creation of a southern Lebanese economic zone, funded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, offering Hezbollah’s fighters and communities alternative livelihoods once their weapons are surrendered.

To be successful, however, the initiative must be seen as Lebanese-led and as strengthening state institutions, rather than appearing as foreign intervention. Investments in infrastructure, agriculture, education, and healthcare should visibly improve life in the south, in particular the south’s Shia community, reducing their reliance on Hezbollah’s patronage and shifting legitimacy back to the state as guarantor of security and opportunity. An economically resilient southern Lebanon does not eliminate the need for military or political solutions but makes them sustainable. By linking disarmament to state-building and social empowerment, Lebanon can gradually weaken the conditions enabling Hezbollah’s decades-long dominance.

A Historic But Perilous Gamble

Lebanon’s wager on disarming Hezbollah strikes at the core of its post-civil war fault line: the coexistence of a sovereign state alongside a heavily armed nonstate actor. Success would restore sovereignty, reassert national institutions, and reduce the constant risk of war with Israel. Yet Hezbollah has signaled it may resist by force, testing the cohesion of the LAF as never before.

The gamble rests on three interlocking fronts: a stronger, modernized LAF to project sovereignty; Israeli restraint and a phased withdrawal to undercut Hezbollah’s rationale for armed resistance; and a southern economic zone to weaken its patronage networks. Each element alone is insufficient, but together they sketch a path for the state to reclaim legitimacy.

The risks, which include sectarian fractures, LAF strains, and Israeli volatility, are immense, but a disciplined pursuit of them could offer Lebanon its first credible chance in decades to dismantle Hezbollah’s parallel state and secure its survival.