There should be much stricter restrictions on the "revolving door" between defense ministries, military commands, and the private arms sector.

The current, largely inadequate regulations in the UK and EU fail to prevent an inherent conflict of interest that can lead to misallocated public funds, compromised national security, and an erosion of public trust.

The Problem with the "Revolving Door"

The "revolving door" phenomenon refers to the movement of individuals between public service and the private sector they once regulated or oversaw. In the defense sector, this movement is particularly common and problematic. Former military officials, defense ministers, and high-level civil servants are highly sought after by arms companies for several key reasons.

• Access to Decision-Makers: A former official has spent years building a network of contacts within government and military commands. Hiring them grants a private company direct access to current ministers, senior civil servants, and military chiefs, often bypassing formal lobbying channels. This creates a deeply unequal playing field, where corporate interests can gain a direct line to policymakers.

• Insider Knowledge: These individuals possess a wealth of confidential information, including details about future defense budgets, strategic priorities, and the weaknesses of a country's military capabilities. This "bureaucratic capital" allows a company to tailor its products, lobbying strategies, and business plans to align perfectly with the government's future needs, giving them a significant competitive advantage over rivals.

• Credibility: A former general or defense minister lends a powerful air of credibility to a company's lobbying efforts. Their arguments for a new weapons system or a specific procurement strategy are often seen as being based on strategic necessity rather than commercial interest, even though they are now employed to sell a product.

The Case for Stricter Restrictions

The arguments for stricter restrictions are centered on preventing conflicts of interest, ensuring efficient use of taxpayer money, and maintaining the integrity of public policy.

• Preventing Regulatory Capture: When the same individuals move back and forth between the public and private sectors, there's a risk of regulatory capture, where the interests of the defense industry are prioritized over the public good. This can lead to governments acquiring weapons systems that are not the most effective or necessary, but are the most profitable for the companies making them.

• Ensuring Value for Money: The revolving door can lead to inflated defense budgets and costly, inefficient projects. Officials who know they may one day work for a defense contractor may be less inclined to challenge a project's cost overruns or delays. They may also favor expensive, high-tech systems that bring in more revenue for their future employers, even if a cheaper, more effective solution exists.

• Restoring Public Trust: The perception that public office is a stepping stone to a lucrative private-sector job erodes public trust in government. It fuels the belief that politicians and officials are not serving the public but are instead using their positions to secure their own financial future. This cynicism undermines the legitimacy of defense policy and government itself.

Current Safeguards and Their Failures

Existing safeguards in the UK and EU are insufficient to address the revolving door problem, which is why stricter rules are necessary.

• The UK's Weak System: In the UK, the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA) is a "toothless watchdog." It can only offer advice, and its recommendations for a "cooling-off period" are not legally binding. A former minister can simply choose to ignore its advice with no penalty. A recent analysis by Transparency International UK found that a staggering 86% of new jobs taken by senior defense officials had a significant overlap with their previous government responsibilities.

• The EU's Insufficient Rules: The EU has ethics rules and a "cooling-off period" for former officials, but these too have been criticized for a lack of rigorous enforcement. In one notable case, the European Ombudsman criticized the European Defence Agency (EDA) for allowing its former chief executive to take a senior role at Airbus, an active lobbyist and recipient of EU defense funds, with insufficient scrutiny.

The Counter-Argument and Rebuttal

The defense industry and its allies argue against stricter restrictions, citing the need for expertise and mobility.

• The "Expertise" Argument: They claim that the complex nature of defense policy requires the specialized knowledge that only former officials can provide. They argue that a former general's experience in procurement or a former minister's understanding of international relations is a valuable asset that shouldn't be wasted.

• The "Mobility" Argument: A complete ban on the revolving door, they argue, would disincentivize talented individuals from entering public service if they know their future employment options will be severely limited.

Rebuttal: While the need for expertise is valid, it does not justify the immense ethical risk. There are other, more transparent ways to gain expert advice, such as through public hearings, expert panels, and formal consultation processes.

The financial incentive provided by the revolving door is simply too great to ignore, and the potential for a conflict of interest, both perceived and real, is too high.

A politician's primary loyalty must be to the public. When they are simultaneously considering their next career move and making decisions that could benefit a future employer, that loyalty is fundamentally compromised.