Whatever the developments in the Ukraine War, strategic nuclear arms control between Moscow and Washington is still worth pursuing.

Somewhat surprisingly, Russian president Vladimir Putin has recently indicated that Russia would support extending the New START strategic nuclear arms control agreement, set to expire in February 2026, for another year. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov stated that, if the New START Treaty were permitted to expire, “…we are truly on the threshold of a situation where we could be left without any bilateral documents regulating strategic stability and security, which, of course, is fraught with great dangers from a global perspective.” In a statement released on September 22, Putin noted that:

In order to prevent the emergence of a new strategic arms race and to preserve an acceptable degree of predictability and restraint, we consider it reasonable to maintain at this turbulent time the status quo established under New START. Accordingly, Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty’s central quantitative restrictions for one year after February 5, 2026.

Putin added that the United States would have to agree to adopt the same policy regarding the observation of New START limits on deployments for another year. The limits in question would presumably include those on the total number of warheads and launchers deployed by both sides under the New START ceilings of 1,550 operational warheads and 700 launchers. Putin also blamed the United States and its allies for the deterioration of strategic stability, an unmistakable reference to NATO military support for Ukrainian resistance to Russia’s war of aggression. 

Putin’s sudden interest in nailing down commitments to New START could be motivated by a number of factors. First, US President Donald Trump’s about-face on the Ukraine War may have prompted Putin’s announcement. At the UN this week, President Trump declared that Ukraine’s victory was possible. Over the last month, Trump has sent new tranches of advanced conventional weapons to Kyiv—many paid for by NATO allies. 

Second, Russia might want additional time to review its own plans for strategic nuclear modernization in view of emerging technologies for hypersonic weapons, drones, artificial intelligence, cyberwar, lasers, and long-range conventional weapons.

Third, Russia may anticipate a financial squeeze on its available resources for future nuclear modernization, given Western threats of additional economic sanctions. 

A fourth possibility is one that Putin alluded to in his announcement: the United States’ interest in a missile defense system. During the late Cold War, President Ronald Reagan’s proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) caused considerable anxiety among Soviet leaders. The Reagan vision was years ahead of the available technology for a workable strategic missile defense, and later presidents modified the program’s overly ambitious objectives. 

President Trump’s proposed Golden Dome doubtless renews Russian concerns about US missile defense, as the technology has improved considerably since the 1980s. The Pentagon has been tasked with developing and deploying comprehensive missile defenses that include space-based interceptors capable of tracking and destroying ballistic missiles in their early boost or post-boost phases. 

According to Putin,  US deployment of a Golden Dome-like system would be a “destabilizing” measure that would “nullify our efforts to maintain the status quo in the field of strategic offensive arms.” In that case, Russia would “respond appropriately.”

Russia obviously wants time to determine the extent to which  US plans for offensive and defensive modernization constitute a fundamental threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. On the one hand, Russia respects the potential of American science and technology to meet the expectations of defense planners and establish new capabilities for military competition in space. 

An ambitious US military space program is also motivated by competition with China, which has indicated its intention to surpass the United States in primacy in commercial and military spacefaring. China also aspires to become a third nuclear superpower alongside the United States and Russia. Military cooperation between Russia and China creates additional pressure for the modernization of American strategic nuclear forces, as well as research and development for strategic antimissile defenses.

Amid these political and technological challenges, the United States and Russia can and should agree on the sensible expedient of extending New START for another year. One issue is whether to reinstate the monitoring and verification protocols that Russia iced in 2023 when it officially suspended participation in New START consultations, while, at the same time, declaring that it would continue to observe the quantitative limits on weapons and launchers included in the treaty. 

If Putin is serious about his commitment to a one-year extension of New START, the rebooting of a monitoring and verification regime should also be on the table. Whether developments in the war in Ukraine will overshadow cooperation on nuclear arms control is unpredictable at this time. Still, there is inherent value in maintaining ongoing channels for nuclear consultations, even in the face of setbacks elsewhere. US-Soviet arms control proceeded during the worst years of the Cold War and under both Republican and Democratic presidents, not to mention a cascade of Soviet leaders.