Eastern and Southern European states differ from Western Europe in their relationship with Beijing by prioritizing economic benefits over political concerns, accepting Chinese investments with fewer conditions, and often taking a more accommodating stance toward Beijing's geopolitical agenda.

This contrasts with Western Europe's more cautious and often critical approach, which emphasizes human rights, trade imbalances, and strategic competition.

Economic and Financial Drivers 

The primary distinction in the relationship is economic. Many Eastern and Southern European countries, still developing and often grappling with significant infrastructure deficits, view Chinese investment as a pragmatic solution to their financial needs.

• Filling a Capital Gap: Countries like Greece, Hungary, and Serbia have received substantial Chinese funding for large-scale infrastructure projects that have been difficult to secure from Western sources. For instance, in the midst of its financial crisis, Greece sold a majority stake in its major Port of Piraeus to Chinese state-owned enterprise COSCO. This investment revitalized the port, but it also gave China a critical entry point into the European market.

• The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): These nations are key partners in China's BRI, which seeks to create a direct trade corridor to Europe. The Budapest-Belgrade railway is a flagship BRI project that, while facing delays and questions about its economic viability, symbolizes the commitment of Hungary and Serbia to a Chinese-led development model. These projects are often financed by Chinese loans with classified terms, which Western critics warn could lead to debt traps and a loss of sovereignty.

In contrast, Western European nations, such as Germany and France, are more cautious. While they have significant trade ties with China, their economies are less dependent on Chinese investment for critical infrastructure. They are more likely to push for transparency in deals and adhere to EU regulations that can slow down or block Chinese projects.

Political and Ideological Alignment 

Eastern and Southern European states often share a more favorable or at least less confrontational political relationship with Beijing than their Western counterparts.

• "No-Strings-Attached" Policy: China’s policy of non-interference in domestic affairs is highly attractive to leaders who may be at odds with the EU's emphasis on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. For a country like Hungary, its "illiberal democracy" model under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has found a compatible partner in Beijing, which doesn't impose political conditionalities.

• Dividing the EU: China has effectively used its relationships with these countries to create divisions within the EU. On multiple occasions, countries like Greece and Hungary have blocked or watered down joint EU statements critical of China's human rights record, its actions in the South China Sea, or its support for Russia. This has made it difficult for the EU to formulate a unified foreign policy and has earned these countries the label of "China's Trojan Horses" within the bloc.

• Serbia's "Iron Friendship": Serbia, an EU candidate country, has fostered a particularly close relationship with China, referring to it as an "iron friendship." Beijing has invested heavily in Serbia's energy and mining sectors, as well as providing diplomatic support on issues like Kosovo. This partnership allows Serbia to balance its relationships with both Russia and the EU while securing much-needed economic benefits from China.

Contrasting the Western European Stance 

Western European nations, particularly France and Germany, have a more complex and often adversarial relationship with China.

• Strategic Competition: The EU has officially designated China as a "systemic rival." Western nations are increasingly concerned about China's growing military power, its intellectual property theft, and its use of economic leverage for political gain. They are pushing for a strategy of "de-risking" to reduce critical dependencies on Chinese supply chains and technology.

• Human Rights and Geopolitics: Western European countries are more vocal about China's human rights record in Xinjiang and its crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong. They also share U.S. concerns about China's stance on Taiwan and its growing naval presence.

• Trade Imbalance: While they are economically intertwined with China, major Western economies are deeply concerned about the massive trade deficit with Beijing, which is seen as a threat to their own industries.

In conclusion, the relationship with China is a microcosm of the deeper divisions within the EU. Eastern and Southern European states see China as a pragmatic economic partner and an alternative to Western influence, while Western European powers view it as a strategic competitor and a political rival.

This divergence in interests and perceptions allows China to pursue a fragmented approach to the EU, weakening the bloc's ability to act as a unified geopolitical force.