China's attempts to influence Canadian politics, elections, and diaspora communities are a central issue in the bilateral relationship.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and a public inquiry have confirmed that Beijing has engaged in a sophisticated and persistent campaign of foreign interference.

This campaign is multifaceted, involving disinformation, the targeting of political figures, and the co-opting and intimidation of the Chinese-Canadian diaspora.

Influencing Canadian Elections and Politicians 

Canadian intelligence and media reports have detailed Chinese government attempts to meddle in Canada's federal elections in both 2019 and 2021. The goal of this interference is not necessarily to swing the election outcome as a whole, but to shape the results in specific ridings (electoral districts) and to influence the overall political landscape in China's favor.

• Supporting Preferred Candidates: According to classified CSIS documents, the Chinese government, through its Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the United Front Work Department, has funneled funds to a network of candidates and their campaign staffers. The purpose was to promote pro-Beijing candidates, particularly in ridings with large Chinese-Canadian populations. These efforts often included undeclared cash donations and encouraging business owners to hire international Chinese students as full-time campaign volunteers.

• Disinformation Campaigns: Beijing has used disinformation campaigns on social media platforms, particularly WeChat, to spread false or misleading information about politicians and their platforms. For example, reports indicate that China has targeted Conservative politicians, portraying them as anti-China and too closely aligned with the policies of President Donald Trump. This has reportedly cost the Conservative party several seats, as confirmed by former leader Erin O'Toole.

• Targeting and Intimidation: China's influence operations have gone beyond elections to directly target Canadian legislators. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has warned that Beijing views Canada as a "high-priority target" and employs a combination of "incentives and punishment" to influence political figures. For example, a Chinese diplomat was accused of threatening and intimidating the family of a Canadian Member of Parliament, Michael Chong, after he sponsored a parliamentary motion condemning China's human rights record. This incident led to Canada expelling the diplomat, a rare move that underscored the seriousness of the threat.

Controlling and Intimidating the Diaspora 

A key component of China's influence strategy is the mobilization and control of the Chinese-Canadian diaspora. The goal is to enforce political loyalty to Beijing and prevent dissent, even on Canadian soil.

• Transnational Repression: China's United Front Work Department and its proxies engage in transnational repression by monitoring and intimidating Chinese Canadians who are critical of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This can include surveillance, threats to family members in mainland China, and the use of "Chinese police stations" in Canada to intimidate dissidents and other critics. These activities are designed to create a climate of fear and self-censorship within the community.

• Controlling Chinese-Language Media: The Chinese government exerts significant influence over Chinese-language media outlets in Canada. These outlets are often pressured to "tell the China story well" by publishing pro-Beijing articles and downplaying or censoring negative news about the CCP. This creates an information environment for many Chinese Canadians that is heavily skewed in Beijing's favor, making it easier for disinformation to take root.

• Leveraging Community Groups: The Chinese Communist Party leverages community organizations, hometown associations, and professional groups within the diaspora to advance its political agenda. These groups are used to mobilize pro-Beijing rallies, organize counter-protests against dissidents, and lobby local politicians. For example, these groups have been used to protest against the independence of Taiwan and to support Beijing's policies on Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

• Cash-for-Access Events: In 2016, reports surfaced that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau had attended "cash-for-access" fundraising events where wealthy Chinese-Canadians with alleged ties to the CCP paid to meet with the Prime Minister. While these events were legally compliant with Canadian fundraising laws, they raised concerns that foreign interests could gain undue influence on Canadian politicians and policy decisions.

In conclusion, China's influence in Canadian politics and diaspora communities is no longer a fringe concern but a major security issue. The strategy is comprehensive, targeting politicians, manipulating elections, and controlling the information environment for Chinese-Canadians. The Canadian government's response, including a public inquiry and new legislation, is an acknowledgment that it can no longer afford to be naive about the nature of this threat and must take a more proactive approach to safeguarding its democratic institutions and protecting its citizens.