Europe’s strategy toward China is significantly, though not solely, shaped by the fear of losing global influence to an ascendant Beijing. This fear manifests across three dimensions: economic dependence, the erosion of liberal international order, and a geopolitical anxiety over Europe's marginalization in the emergent Sino-American rivalry.

However, Europe's strategy is complex and often fragmented because this shared fear is tempered by the profound desire to remain a critical economic partner to China, as well as a genuine, values-based commitment to human rights and multilateralism. The resulting strategy is therefore one of often contradictory efforts: simultaneously attempting to "de-risk" economically, reasserting liberal values, and seeking to maintain "strategic autonomy" from both Washington and Beijing.

The following analysis will detail the historical context of Europe’s approach, examine the key fears driving the current strategy, and explore the internal divisions that limit a unified European response, aiming for a comprehensive treatment of over 900 words.

I. Historical Context: From Engagement to Anxiety

For decades following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Europe’s strategy was overwhelmingly one of "comprehensive engagement." The prevailing belief was that economic interdependence and the integration of China into the liberal international order would lead to gradual political convergence. European foreign policy, particularly that of economic giants like Germany, prioritized trade and investment, viewing China primarily as a colossal market and a reliable manufacturing base.

This perspective began to shift dramatically in the late 2010s. The realization that economic integration had not led to political liberalization, coupled with China’s increasing economic coercion, technological ascent, and assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping, fundamentally changed the European risk assessment. The EU officially designated China in 2019 as a "partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival," formally acknowledging the multifaceted threat to Europe's global influence and values.

II. The Three Core European Fears Driving Strategy

The fear of losing global influence to Beijing is not abstract; it is driven by concrete anxieties that underpin Europe’s current strategic adjustments.

A. Fear of Economic Dependence and Sovereignty Erosion

The most immediate and palpable fear is the loss of economic sovereignty through over-reliance on the Chinese market and supply chains. For many European industries, particularly the German automotive sector and specialized machinery manufacturers, China is the largest single market. This reliance creates a vulnerability to economic coercion.

• Weaponization of Interdependence: The EU observed how Beijing used trade pressure against states like Australia and Lithuania following political disagreements. This demonstrated that deep economic ties could be weaponized to silence European criticism on issues ranging from human rights (Xinjiang, Hong Kong) to sovereignty (Taiwan). The fear is that European foreign policy will be held hostage by the threat of losing access to the Chinese market.

• The De-risking Imperative: This fear has driven the central strategic shift from "decoupling" (seen as too costly) to "de-risking." This strategy aims to reduce critical dependencies—especially for raw materials, rare earths, batteries, and pharmaceuticals—by diversifying supply chains and strengthening domestic production capacity. Measures include the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and efforts to enhance the screening of foreign (read: Chinese) direct investment, all designed to prevent Beijing from gaining undue influence over European critical infrastructure and key technologies. The strategy is fundamentally about preserving Europe’s economic and industrial base from a dominant competitor.

B. Fear of Technological Marginalization

European elites recognize that the 21st century's global influence will be determined by dominance in nascent technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, 5G/6G, and biotechnology. China’s massive state-led investment and the "Made in China 2025" industrial strategy are viewed with alarm.

• The Innovation Gap: There is a growing fear that Europe is being squeezed between the innovation powerhouses of the U.S. and China. If Europe falls behind, it will be reduced to an innovation-taker, relying on either American or Chinese-developed platforms and standards. This is a direct loss of future global influence, as technological standards often shape global governance and economic norms.

• Data and Digital Sovereignty: China’s digital authoritarian model, which controls vast amounts of data, poses a direct ideological and competitive threat to the European commitment to data privacy (e.g., GDPR). The strategy here is to establish the EU as a "regulatory superpower"—setting global digital norms to prevent Chinese standards from becoming the international default. This is a direct attempt to project European influence through non-military, regulatory power.

C. Fear of the Erosion of the Liberal International Order

Beyond economics and technology, a central strategic anxiety is the loss of influence in shaping the rules and norms of global governance. Beijing’s model of state capitalism and its growing power in multilateral institutions are viewed as corrosive to the values-based system Europe built post-World War II.

• Undermining Multilateralism: China's efforts to redefine human rights and democracy within bodies like the United Nations Human Rights Council, and its expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—which often bypasses traditional multilateral lending rules and transparency requirements—are seen as direct challenges to the European-backed order.

• A "Values" Foreign Policy: In response, European strategy has integrated human rights and democratic values more explicitly into its trade and investment policies. The push for the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) stalled precisely because China refused to provide assurances on labor standards, reflecting a values-based red line drawn by the European Parliament. This is a deliberate effort to project moral and normative influence globally, differentiating the European approach from purely transaction-based diplomacy.

III. Strategic Fragmentation and the Limits of Fear

While the fear of losing influence provides a unifying conceptual frame, the execution of Europe’s strategy is heavily limited by internal fragmentation and conflicting national interests. This lack of unity is, itself, a cause of Europe’s diminished influence.

A. The North-South and East-West Divides

• Economic Realpolitik vs. Values: Major economic powers, notably Germany and, to a lesser extent, France, often prioritize market access and cooperation on global challenges (like climate change) over confrontation. Their strategies tend to be more pragmatic, focusing on carefully managed competition. In contrast, Eastern European nations, which have recent historical experience with authoritarian dominance, and smaller nations often take a tougher, more value-driven stance on sovereignty and security, viewing U.S. engagement as a necessary counterweight to Beijing.

• The Bilateral Trap: China has skillfully exploited this fragmentation through "divide and rule" tactics, engaging member states bilaterally or through formats like the former "16+1" (now "14+1") with Central and Eastern European countries. This dilutes the EU's collective negotiating power, allowing Beijing to secure preferential deals or divide consensus on sensitive issues.

B. The Quest for Strategic Autonomy

The European strategy is further complicated by the aspiration for "strategic autonomy," particularly championed by France. This concept—a key mechanism for preserving Europe’s own global influence—seeks to position the EU as an independent global actor, not merely a junior partner to the United States.

• The fear here is dual: fear of China’s dominance and fear of being trapped in an American-led confrontation that does not serve European economic or security interests. Consequently, Europe avoids full alignment with Washington's more hawkish strategy (which often focuses on containment), preferring to maintain a space for engagement on global issues and avoiding a costly decoupling that could derail Europe’s fragile economic recovery.

In conclusion, Europe’s China strategy is a direct reflection of its anxieties about an ascendant Beijing. It is a strategy designed to manage decline and assert relevance in a multipolar world. The fear of losing global influence—economically, technologically, and normatively—is the primary engine driving policy shifts like "de-risking" and the re-emphasis on regulatory power. However, this fear is mediated by pragmatic economic imperatives and internal political divisions, resulting in a strategy that remains an often-awkward balance of competition, cooperation, and rivalry. Europe ultimately seeks to be a third pole of global influence, but its success hinges on its ability to transcend its internal differences and project a unified, resilient strategic vision in the face of China’s growing power.