Global Competition and the New Rare Earth Geopolitics

The 21st century has entered a new phase of geopolitical rivalry — one no longer fought over oil wells or naval bases, but over the invisible metals that power the modern world. Rare earth elements (REEs), once a niche topic for geologists, now sit at the heart of global power politics. They are essential to everything from smartphones and wind turbines to advanced fighter jets and artificial intelligence systems. Whoever controls their supply chains, refining, and downstream industries will control the commanding heights of the 21st-century economy.

In this shifting landscape, China, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and emerging regions like Africa and Southeast Asia are all maneuvering to secure their positions. The competition for rare earths is not just about minerals—it is about technological dominance, industrial sovereignty, and geopolitical leverage.

1. From Cold War to Critical Minerals War

During the 20th century, oil defined geopolitics. Control of petroleum reserves determined the rise and fall of nations. Today, a similar dynamic is emerging with rare earths. Instead of barrels of oil, it’s kilograms of neodymium, dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium that determine power.

These materials are indispensable in:

• Defense systems (stealth aircraft, missile guidance, radar)

• Renewable energy (wind turbines, electric motors)

• Consumer electronics (phones, computers, displays)

• Emerging tech (AI chips, robotics, quantum devices)

But unlike oil, rare earths are not scarce in nature — they are geographically concentrated in production and refining. Over 85% of refined REEs come from China, giving Beijing enormous strategic leverage over global industry.

2. China’s Rise: From Miner to Monopoly

China’s dominance did not happen by chance. It was the product of decades of deliberate industrial strategy.

• In the 1980s, while the U.S. led in mining at Mountain Pass (California), China began quietly investing in refining technology and downstream applications.

• By the 1990s, Chinese producers could undercut global prices due to cheaper labor and looser environmental regulations. Western mines shut down as they became uneconomical.

• By the 2000s, Beijing controlled the entire supply chain — from mining to magnets.

China’s state-backed model ensured coordination between mining firms, refineries, and high-tech manufacturers. The result: today, Chinese companies dominate the production of NdFeB magnets, which are the core components in electric vehicles, drones, and renewable energy generators.

This dominance gives China geoeconomic leverage. In 2010, during a diplomatic dispute with Japan, China temporarily restricted REE exports — a warning to the world about the strategic power of supply control. Since then, countries have sought alternatives, but few have achieved meaningful diversification.

3. The U.S. and Allied Response: Building Resilience

Realizing their vulnerability, the U.S. and its allies have shifted strategies from dependence to resilience.

a. The U.S. Strategy

• The U.S. Department of Defense now lists rare earths as “critical minerals for national security.”

• Funding has been directed toward restarting the Mountain Pass mine, establishing refining partnerships with Australia, and developing recycling programs.

• Washington launched the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) in 2022 — a coalition with the EU, Japan, Australia, and Canada to create transparent, non-Chinese supply chains.

However, the challenge remains: even if the U.S. mines more REEs, refining capacity and magnet production still depend heavily on China. Without investment in the middle and downstream segments, the U.S. risks remaining a raw material exporter rather than a technology leader.

b. Japan and South Korea

Japan learned the hard way after China’s 2010 export restriction. It invested in recycling, deep-sea mining research, and partnerships with Australia and Vietnam. Japan now leads in REE magnet recycling, though still imports most of its feedstock. South Korea, meanwhile, integrates REEs into its advanced semiconductor and battery industries, aiming to reduce import risks.

c. The European Union

Europe imports nearly all its rare earths. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (2023) sets ambitious goals to ensure at least 40% of processing and 15% of extraction occurs within the EU by 2030. Yet, environmental rules and local resistance complicate progress. As a result, Europe is increasingly looking to Africa and Greenland for strategic partnerships.

4. Emerging Players: Africa, India, and Southeast Asia

As global powers scramble for stability, new centers of opportunity are emerging.

Africa

Africa could play a transformative role as the next rare earth refining and production hub (as discussed in Part 7). With deposits in Tanzania, Malawi, Burundi, and South Africa, the continent can position itself as a neutral supplier to all sides, balancing relations between China and the West.

India

India’s monazite-rich coastal sands hold major REE potential. New Delhi is expanding cooperation with Australia and Japan to develop refining and magnet-making capabilities, aiming to reduce dependence on Chinese imports.

Southeast Asia

Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia are becoming critical nodes. Vietnam is believed to have the world’s second-largest REE reserves, and Malaysia hosts Lynas Corporation, the only significant non-Chinese rare earth refinery.

5. The Strategic Chessboard: Supply Chains as Soft Power

Rare earth supply chains have become instruments of soft power and coercion. Control over them allows nations to:

• Influence global manufacturing flows.

• Shape alliances through resource diplomacy.

• Impose economic pressure without direct military confrontation.

For instance:

• China’s dominance gives it “supply-chain veto power” over industries like EVs and semiconductors.

• The U.S. and EU now view mineral partnerships with Africa and Latin America as part of their strategic deterrence against Chinese leverage.

• Countries with refining capacity — even small producers like Malaysia — gain outsized geopolitical influence.

Thus, rare earths have become a currency of global power, defining not just wealth but autonomy in the age of technology.

6. The Next Phase: Refining and Recycling Alliances

The new phase of rare earth geopolitics will not be fought over mines alone but over refining technology, recycling efficiency, and green innovation.

Future power will lie in:

• Refining Independence – Nations that can purify REEs domestically will command value chains.

• Recycling Systems – Urban mining of old electronics and magnets could supply 20–30% of future REE demand.

• Technological Substitutes – Research into non-REE magnets (e.g., ferrites or alnico alloys) could reduce strategic vulnerability.

Africa, Japan, and Europe could collaborate in “Green Refining Corridors”, using clean technology to replace China’s environmentally intensive methods.

7. 5–10 Year Forecast: The Battle for Balance

By 2030–2035, global rare earth geopolitics will likely follow one of three scenarios:

1. Multipolar Supply Chain
   China retains dominance but loses its monopoly as Africa, the U.S., and Australia expand refining. This creates stability through diversification.

2. Bifurcated System
   Two competing ecosystems emerge — a China-led Eastern bloc and a Western alliance led by the U.S. and its partners. Supply chains split geopolitically, similar to how semiconductor networks have divided.

3. Green Global Alliance
   If environmental and economic cooperation prevails, nations could form a global rare earth governance framework, focusing on sustainability, transparency, and fair pricing — an “OPEC for clean minerals.”

The most probable outcome is a hybrid of the first two: diversification with ongoing geopolitical competition. In this world, Africa becomes the swing producer, much like Saudi Arabia’s role in oil markets — able to stabilize or shift global balance depending on alliances.

8. The New Geopolitical Gold

Rare earths have redefined the logic of global power. Nations that once competed for colonies and oil now compete for mines, refineries, and material scientists. The map of influence is being redrawn — not by tanks or aircraft carriers, but by supply chains and refining plants.

As this century unfolds, success will belong not to the countries with the most resources, but to those that control how those resources are refined, integrated, and deployed.

If Africa, India, and other emerging regions seize this moment, they could shift the balance of industrial power for generations. The next superpower may not be the one with the largest army or economy—but the one with the purest supply of rare earth oxides.

By John Ikeji-Uju

https://ubuntusafa.com/Ikeji

https://ubuntusafa.com/