The question of whether Africa is truly receiving investment from China aimed at growth and shared prosperity, or whether China is primarily using the continent to access cheap land, labour and natural resources under the guise of “partnership,” is both timely and complex.

The answer lies somewhere between the two—but leaning towards the latter in many cases.

Below is a detailed examination of the evidence, key mechanisms, counter-arguments and final assessment.

Evidence of Chinese involvement in African growth

First, it is important to recognise that China’s official and corporate rhetoric emphasises African growth, industrialisation, capacity-building and infrastructure. Examples include:

• According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China plans to “promote industry partnering and production-capacity cooperation between China and Africa,” build or upgrade industrial parks, send senior government advisers into Africa, set up regional vocational education centres, and train 200,000 African technical personnel. 

• China says it will encourage Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa’s agricultural modernisation — large-scale farming, animal husbandry, storage and processing — aiming “to create more local jobs and increase farmers’ income.” 

• Chinese data claim that by end 2023, China’s direct investment stock in Africa exceeded US$40 billion, and Chinese firms have created more than 1.1 million local jobs during the prior three years. 

• Infrastructure: China notes that from 2016–2020 Chinese companies accounted for ~31 % of all infrastructure projects in Africa. 

These facts suggest that there is something meaningful happening: investment, infrastructure, jobs, and rhetoric of partnership. From a surface level, one can argue these are the hallmarks of a growth-oriented investment approach.

Mechanisms by which China accesses cheap land, labour and resources

However, alongside the growth narrative are strong patterns and mechanisms that suggest that China’s underlying objective is often access: to land, to natural resources, to labour, and to new markets. The evidence includes:

Natural-resource extraction and trade patterns

• Critics point out that Africa continues to export primary raw materials to China while importing Chinese manufactured goods — reinforcing a pattern of resource-supplier and buyer of finished goods rather than industrial equal partner. 

• For example, Chinese firms have large stakes in mining operations in Africa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) example: the Dikuluwe mine near Kolwezi is operated by a consortium of which the Chinese share is majority. 

• The “cheap land” mechanism: large-scale agricultural projects by Chinese companies in African countries have been criticised for land-acquisition, displacing local communities, and focusing on export crops rather than local food sovereignty. 

Labour, importation of Chinese workers, and low value-addition

• Some analyses suggest Chinese construction firms rely substantially on Chinese labour — which limits local job creation, skill transfer, and local capacity building. Example: the NRDC report notes reliance on Chinese labour in some cases. 

• Since many projects are infrastructure or extraction, rather than downstream manufacturing, the value-added captured locally is limited; the higher-value steps (processing, manufacturing) often occur elsewhere.

Debt and economic leverage

• Chinese loans to African states for infrastructure are often structured in ways that critics argue give China leverage. The “debt-trap diplomacy” critique holds that while the stated aim is infrastructure for development, the underlying objective is access and long-term influence. 

• Conditions are often opaque; local governments may have taken on large loans for projects that may not generate sufficient economic returns to cover repayment, leaving fiscal stress and increased dependence. 

Market access and export orientation

• China’s imports of African commodities helps secure its industrial growth; Africa becomes a supply base, sometimes with limited benefits being returned. For instance, the China-Africa trade volume reached US$282 billion in 2023. 

• Furthermore, Chinese exports of low-cost manufactured goods to Africa may undercut local industries, making Africa more dependent as a consumer of Chinese goods rather than building its own manufacturing. 

The “Hybrid” reality: both growth investment and self-interest

The truth is that the China-Africa relationship is neither purely altruistic investment for African growth nor purely exploitative resource grab — it is a hybrid with both components. Below I unpack how these two strands coexist, overlap and conflict.

Growth-oriented elements

• Infrastructure build-out: African countries have long had large infrastructure deficits (roads, rail, power). Chinese firms have stepped into that gap. Even if the motive is partly securing resource flows, the result is infrastructure that can support growth.

• Capacity building and local jobs: The rhetoric and some evidence show China is investing in vocational training, technical personnel, agricultural demonstration centres, and special economic/industrial zones. Those kinds of investments could support industrialisation.

• Diversification rhetoric: Chinese statements emphasise industrial parks, manufacturing and agriculture rather than just mining and extraction. For example: “encourage Chinese enterprises to engage in large-scale farming … processing in Africa … create more local jobs”. 

Self-interest / access-oriented elements

• Natural-resource supply dominance: China clearly has strategic interests in securing resources (metals, minerals, oil, land) to feed its own industrial growth. In many cases, the extraction is oriented towards Chinese demand rather than African domestic development.

• Low value-capture for African countries: As earlier, much of the value-chain remains abroad; Africa may gain extraction royalties, wages, but misses out on processing/manufacturing profits.

• Debt and leverage: Infrastructure/loan deals can bind African states to China in ways that reduce their policy autonomy and link future production to Chinese firms/markets.

• Cheap labour/export-driven logic: Some Chinese firms may locate in Africa to take advantage of comparatively lower labour costs, looser regulation, favourable land/lease terms — essentially shifting part of their cost base to Africa rather than Africa shifting its economy upward.

The tensions

• If a Chinese-funded railway is built primarily to move copper from a mine to a port for export to China, is that growth-oriented for Africa, or access-oriented for China? Possibly both — but the balance may favour the latter.

• If an agricultural project uses large tracts of land for export crops controlled by Chinese firms, creating few local food processing industries — is that good investment or land grab? The answer depends on local context and contract terms.

• Many African governments actively sought Chinese investment precisely because it offered infrastructure and financing with relatively fewer political conditions than Western donors. That gives them agency — but also risk.

Key empirical features showing the access-orientation

Here are specific features of the China-Africa investment pattern that strongly indicate the “access” orientation:

1. Resource-backed lending: Some Chinese loans are explicitly backed by future resource extraction or reserved access. That shapes deal terms.

2. Export-oriented extractive projects: Many Chinese investments are in mining/commodities with the end-destination being Chinese industry rather than the African domestic economy.

3. Large land leases for agriculture: African land-use agreements and plantations oriented for export may reduce land available for local smallholder farming.

4. Import-export imbalance: African exports to China are heavily raw materials; Chinese exports to Africa are manufactured goods. That reinforces dependency. 

5. Limited processing in-Africa: Rather than refining/processing within Africa, many raw materials are exported. This means China retains the high-value end of the chain.

Why this matters: growth vs dependency

The difference between real growth investment and access-oriented investment is critical for African development outcomes:

• If investment is truly growth-oriented, you would expect industrial upgrading, local value-addition, job creation, local enterprise development, skills transfer, and diversification away from raw materials.

• If investment is largely access-oriented, you may get infrastructure and jobs, but risk: export dependency, resource-based growth without diversification, limited local capacity, debt burdens, and vulnerability to commodity cycles or external shocks.

In other words: growth means transforming Africa’s economies; access means tapping Africa’s resources and labour for the benefit of the foreign investor.

Final assessment

So: Is China investing in African growth, or merely buying access? Both. But the dominant dynamic tilts toward access rather than growth in many cases. My assessment:

• On one hand, there is genuine, visible investment by Chinese firms in infrastructure, agriculture, industrial zones and employment — and that is positive and can support African growth if leveraged properly.

• On the other hand, the architecture of many deals, the pattern of exports/imports, the orientation of processing, the debt structures and the labour/land practices suggest a strong motive of access to cheap land, labour and raw materials.

• In many instances, Africa is benefiting to an extent—jobs are created, infrastructure is built—but the transformative element (industrialisation, local wealth capture, upward mobility of value chains) remains weak.

• African governments and civil society must treat Chinese investment with strategic caution: use it, but negotiate strong local content, beneficiation requirements (processing locally), transparency, debt sustainability, local enterprise linkage and skill transfer. Without those, the risk is that Africa remains the raw-material frontline for Chinese industry rather than a partner in mutual growth.

Recommendations for African states and stakeholders

To shift the balance more toward genuine growth investment rather than access-oriented deals, African actors should:

1. Negotiate value-chain depth: Insist that resource extraction projects include downstream processing or manufacturing in-country or regionally.

2. Set strong local content and labour conditions: Require foreign investors to hire locally, train and transfer skills rather than importing large numbers of expatriate labour.

3. Review and control land leases: Ensure large agricultural/leasing deals generate local food security benefits, smallholder inclusion, ecological safeguards, and fair compensation.

4. Ensure debt transparency and repayment capacity: Undertake rigorous project feasibility studies, ensure infrastructure deals generate sustainable revenue streams, avoid over-reliance on one creditor.

5. Encourage diversification and local enterprise development: Use foreign investment as a stepping stone into manufacturing, services, regional trade rather than only raw-materials-export.

6. Monitor environmental and social impacts: Protect local communities from displacement, pollution, unfair labour, and ensure environmental regulation is enforced.

7. Use regional integration: Build regional value chains—if Africa can integrate processing across countries, it has more bargaining power and can attract manufacturing rather than simply extraction.

In sum: Yes — China is investing significantly in Africa, and many of those investments do have growth potential. But the underlying drivers of much of the investment appear to be oriented toward securing cheap land, labour and raw materials rather than exclusively promoting African inclusive industrial growth. The choice for African countries is not whether to engage with China — but how to structure that engagement so that it becomes a springboard for local economic transformation rather than a perpetuation of raw-material dependence.