European elites are demonstrating a complex and evolving alignment with U.S. and AUKUS strategies to address China's growing influence in the Pacific, adopting a position that often involves convergence on strategic concerns but divergence on the pace and explicit nature of containment.

While there is a general European acknowledgment of the need to push back against Chinese assertiveness and protect a rules-based international order, their approach is primarily focused on "de-risking" economic dependencies and upholding freedom of navigation through their own Indo-Pacific strategies, rather than fully embracing the security-first, hard-containment rhetoric favored by the U.S. and AUKUS nations.

European Consensus on the China Challenge

European countries, including the major powers of France and Germany, increasingly share many of the core concerns driving the U.S. and AUKUS approach. This is evident across several dimensions:

• Economic Security and De-Risking: European elites are deeply worried about China's economic coercion (as seen in the dispute with Lithuania) and the vulnerability created by reliance on China for critical materials and supply chains. This has led to the EU adopting a "de-risking" policy, which aims to reduce reliance without full "decoupling," aligning with a key pillar of U.S. strategy.

• Geopolitical and Values-Based Concerns: Concerns over China's human rights record, its actions in Hong Kong, its increasing military pressure on Taiwan, and its challenges to maritime security in the South China Sea are widely acknowledged in European capitals. China's continued, albeit tacit, support for Russia's aggression against Ukraine has further accelerated this geopolitical awakening, linking the European and Indo-Pacific security theaters.

• Increased Military Presence: Several European states, including France, the UK (already an AUKUS member), Germany, and the Netherlands, have increased their naval deployments and participation in exercises in the Indo-Pacific. These deployments, often framed as upholding the rules-based international order and freedom of navigation, serve a clear signaling function in the context of deterring China's challenge to the regional status quo.

Nuances and Divergences in European Strategy

Despite the increasing convergence of strategic assessment, the European approach is marked by significant differences in both emphasis and execution compared to Washington and the AUKUS partners.

The Shadow of AUKUS and Strategic Autonomy

The formation of AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) in 2021 proved to be a pivotal, yet complicated, moment for transatlantic alignment.

• French Outrage: The pact led to the abrupt cancellation of a massive French submarine contract with Australia, sparking a major diplomatic rift. France viewed the secrecy and the deal itself as a "stab in the back" and a sign that the U.S. was prioritizing its own minilateral security arrangements over broader allied cooperation.

• A Call for EU Autonomy: The AUKUS incident, alongside concerns about U.S. domestic political instability potentially leading to a shift away from Europe, significantly reinforced the calls from French officials and others for greater European strategic autonomy—the capacity to act independently in defense and foreign policy.

• Mixed EU Reaction: While many European leaders expressed solidarity with France, others, like Poland, saw AUKUS as a welcome sign of the U.S. commitment to counter-balancing autocracies, including China.

"Cooperation" vs. "Containment"

The European Union's official approach, outlined in its "Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific," is notably distinct from the explicit "containment" or "strategic competition" language of the U.S. and AUKUS.

• Economic Focus: The EU's strategy emphasizes trade, investment, diversification of partnerships, and collaboration on global challenges like climate change, often prioritizing an economics-driven approach. This is partly a reflection of the EU's institutional strengths and the difficulty of forging a common security policy among 27 member states.

• Maintaining Relations with China: The EU seeks to maintain a multifaceted relationship with China, engaging bilaterally on common challenges while protecting its interests and values where disagreements exist. European countries, particularly Germany, remain heavily reliant on the Chinese market for their economies, leading to an inevitable caution regarding full-scale confrontation. This balancing act means Europe is less likely to support the most assertive U.S. measures, such as imposing sweeping trade or technology sanctions that lack a clear multilateral consensus.

France, Germany, and the "Third Path"

The two largest continental European powers—France and Germany—have subtly adjusted their approaches in the wake of AUKUS and the broader geopolitical shifts:

• France: As the only European resident power in the Pacific (with territories and a military presence), France has historically been the most engaged. Post-AUKUS, however, French policy has sought to champion a "third path," emphasizing multilateralism, the centrality of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and avoiding the logic of a simple U.S.-China bipolar rivalry.

• Germany: Traditionally focused on economic ties, Germany has taken notable steps toward a more security-conscious stance. The deployment of a German frigate to the Indo-Pacific and a greater willingness to position the region as a priority indicate a shift toward a more "French approach," albeit with a continued emphasis on soft security and economic objectives.

Conclusion: Alignment, Not Assimilation

European elites are indeed aligning with the fundamental strategic goal of addressing and mitigating China's influence in the Pacific, but their strategy is one of alignment without full assimilation to the U.S. and AUKUS framework.

The convergence is driven by shared concerns over Chinese economic coercion, human rights, and threats to the rules-based order, which the war in Ukraine has heightened. However, Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy, its sensitivity to the economic consequences of full containment, and the residual effects of the AUKUS snub mean its policy is best characterized as a "de-risking" and "cooperation-focused" effort rather than an all-in "containment" strategy. The alignment is directional—moving away from past accommodation of China—but remains distinct in its instruments, tone, and strategic objectives.