European elites view their role in the Pacific balance of power between the U.S. and China through the lens of "strategic autonomy" and "de-risking," seeking to be a significant "third way" rather than a passive alignment.

Their primary goal is to maintain a rules-based, multilateral order that protects their massive economic interests in the region, without becoming a security vassal of the U.S. or an economic captive of China.

This balancing act is characterized by a desire to work with the U.S. to contain China's assertiveness while simultaneously avoiding an overt, security-driven polarization that could force an irreparable rift with Beijing.

1. The European Strategic Posture: No "Choosing Sides"

European elites largely reject the notion of being forced to "choose a side" in the U.S.-China rivalry, which they perceive as a dangerous zero-sum game. Their preferred posture is built on a few core tenets:

Strategic Autonomy (The Middle Path)

The concept of Strategic Autonomy is the philosophical underpinning of the European approach. It reflects the ambition to cultivate the military, economic, and diplomatic capacity to define and pursue European interests independently. In the context of the Pacific:

• Non-Alignment, Not Equidistance: While France, the key European resident power, emphasizes that its position is "in no case one of equidistance" between Washington and Beijing (leaning toward its democratic, Western ally), the overall EU strategy is to resist bloc geopolitics. This aims to avoid the perception of being an American "vassal," a criticism notably voiced by French President Emmanuel Macron.

• Preventing Decoupling: Europe recognizes that its economic fortunes are deeply tied to China (China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners). The EU has adopted a policy of "de-risking"—reducing vulnerabilities and harmful dependencies on China in strategic sectors like critical raw materials and technologies—rather than the more aggressive "decoupling" pursued by some in the U.S.

The Triple Relationship with China

The EU's official characterization of China highlights its multi-faceted, often contradictory, engagement:

1. Partner on global issues (climate change, health, non-proliferation).

2. Economic Competitor (pushing for a level playing field, challenging subsidized overcapacity).

3. Systemic Rival (disagreeing on political models, human rights, and the nature of the international order).

This tripartite view allows European diplomacy to challenge China on values and governance while keeping vital economic and cooperative channels open.

2. Mechanisms of Influence: Normative, Economic, and Resident Hard Power

Europe's contribution to the Pacific balance of power is delivered through a unique mix of instruments that leverage its identity as a global Normative Power and its specific military assets.

A. Upholding the Rules-Based Order (Normative Power)

This is the most consistent and unified aspect of the European role. European elites believe their most valuable contribution is to focus the global discussion on international law and effective multilateralism, rather than raw power dynamics.

• Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs): Key European powers, including France, the UK, and Germany, have deployed naval assets (frigates, aircraft carrier strike groups) to the Indo-Pacific, including transits through the South China Sea. These operations are explicitly framed as upholding freedom of navigation and international law, not as direct challenges or symbolic gestures of alliance with the U.S. The French navy, for instance, often refrains from sailing within the 12-nautical-mile limit of contested features to avoid being seen as directly taking a side on territorial disputes.

• Multilateralism and Regional Partnerships: The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (2021) prioritizes strengthening ties with "like-minded partners" in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, India, and ASEAN nations. This strategy leverages the EU's competence in trade and diplomacy to build a network of partners committed to global governance, thereby diluting the pressure for regional states to choose between Washington and Beijing.

B. The Economic and Connectivity Bridge (Global Gateway)

European elites seek to use economic statecraft to reduce reliance on the U.S. and mitigate China's economic coercion, offering an alternative model for infrastructure development.

• Global Gateway Initiative: This is the EU's response to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It commits billions of euros to develop "smart, clean, and secure links" in digital, energy, and transport sectors globally, including the Indo-Pacific. By offering an alternative funding model based on transparency, sustainability, and respect for sovereignty, Europe attempts to counterbalance the influence of both U.S. private investment-led models and Chinese state-led development finance.

• Trade Agreements: The successful conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with New Zealand and the negotiations with Australia are designed to lock in economic ties with key democracies in the region, ensuring that European economic interests remain diversified and resilient.

C. The Resident French Factor (Hard Power Anchor)

France stands apart as the only European Union nation that is also a "resident" Indo-Pacific power, with overseas territories (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Réunion) and the world's second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

• Permanent Military Presence: France maintains a permanent military presence of over 7,000 personnel in the region. This is a crucial element of the European security contribution, allowing France to act as an "inclusive and stabilizing power" and a physical, non-U.S. anchor for humanitarian and security cooperation.

• Bridge Between Continents: French elites consciously promote their role as a "bridge" between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific, giving credibility to the notion that European security and the security of the Pacific are "inseparable."

3. The Internal Division and Constraints

The European role is inherently limited by internal disagreements and external constraints, which sometimes frustrate the U.S. and dilute the EU's overall strategic impact.

• Transatlantic Tensions: There remains a fundamental difference in strategic priorities. The U.S. views China primarily through a security and military competition lens, while the EU still gives significant weight to trade and climate cooperation. Washington is often frustrated by Europe's perceived hesitancy to align on issues like Taiwan Strait stability or sanctions.

• The Russia-Ukraine War: The war in Europe's backyard has forced a re-prioritization of military and financial resources. This has led some analysts to argue that Europe cannot make a truly "meaningful security contribution" to the Pacific and should instead focus fully on its own region, a view that runs counter to the broader European goal of global influence.

• Member State Fragmentation: Despite the formal EU Strategy, individual member states—driven by unique economic or historical ties—often pursue bilateral policies that do not always align perfectly with the Brussels consensus, making it difficult for the EU to speak with a single, authoritative voice.

In conclusion, European elites do not see their role as a mere footnote to the U.S.-China rivalry; they see themselves as a necessary moderating force whose stability-oriented approach offers a multilateral alternative to the prevailing bipolar confrontation. They aim to contribute to the Pacific balance of power by promoting an international environment where their massive trade interests are secured by rules and diversification rather than by relying entirely on the military dominance of a single superpower.