The assertion that European elites use NATO to secure U.S. and allied markets for European defense technology is an oversimplification of a complex economic and political struggle.

While NATO is the central platform used by European nations to promote their defense industries and push for greater market access, the reality is that the European defense industry remains structurally disadvantaged in the vast U.S. market.

European elites leverage NATO to pursue interoperability, standardization, and joint procurement, which are genuine military goals that simultaneously create commercial opportunities.

However, their primary success is in securing European and Canadian markets, with access to the U.S. market remaining heavily restricted by U.S. protectionist policies.

NATO as the Necessary Gateway for Market Access

European nations and their defense firms do not use NATO as a simple sales channel, but rather as the indispensable political and technical framework for achieving a degree of market integration.

1. Standardization and Interoperability

The core military function of NATO is to ensure that allied forces can fight together effectively. This is achieved through Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), which dictate common protocols for everything from communication systems to ammunition sizes.

• Commercial Ramifications: When a European company designs a weapon system or component to meet a NATO STANAG, it is not just meeting a military requirement; it is automatically making its product interoperable with the forces of all 32 NATO nations, including the U.S. and Canada. This dramatically increases the potential market size from a single national military to the entire Alliance.

• The 'Ticket to Play': For a European system to be considered for any allied market, including the U.S., it must first be NATO-certified. European elites actively promote the adoption of standards that align with their domestic technologies (e.g., European-designed missiles or artillery calibers), effectively making their products the default choice for joint programs.

2. Multinational Procurement and Pooled Demand

European elites push for multinational procurement initiatives within NATO to aggregate the defense needs of smaller countries, creating large, commercially viable orders that favor major European defense primes like BAE Systems, Airbus, and Thales.

• NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA): The NSPA facilitates collective buying, which allows smaller European allies to purchase major systems more economically. This platform is heavily used to pool demand for European-made equipment, such as air-to-air refueling aircraft or pooled ammunition stocks, strengthening the regional industrial base.

• Signaling Market Intent: When key European nations agree to a joint program under a NATO or EU flag (e.g., the Eurofighter or various missile programs), it sends a clear signal to other allies—including North American ones—that a mature, well-supported, and potentially superior system is available, making it a credible competitor to U.S. systems.

The Imbalance: U.S. Protectionism vs. European Openness

Despite Europe's best efforts through NATO, the flow of defense technology remains heavily imbalanced, primarily benefiting the U.S.

The U.S. Market Barrier: ITAR and "Buy American"

The U.S. defense market, by far the world's largest, remains exceptionally difficult for European firms to penetrate due to deep-seated protectionist measures:

1. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): ITAR is the main regulatory hurdle. It imposes stringent restrictions on the export and transfer of U.S. defense technology, even to close allies. European companies incorporating even a small U.S. component into their product face massive regulatory compliance burdens, making their systems less attractive to global buyers and extremely difficult to sell to the U.S. military.

2. "Buy American" Act (1933): This legislation heavily favors domestic U.S. manufacturers in federal procurement, including defense. While exceptions exist for allies with Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), the U.S. defense establishment retains a strong institutional bias toward U.S. suppliers.

As a result of this imbalance, approximately two-thirds of European NATO countries' defense procurement from outside the EU/NATO region comes from the United States, yet U.S. procurement of European systems is a small fraction of that amount. This demonstrates the limited success of European elites in using NATO to create true reciprocity.

European Strategic Autonomy: The Counter-Strategy

In a direct response to this unequal access and the recurring political pressure from the U.S. to "buy American," European elites are now using NATO and parallel EU structures to explicitly build an alternative, integrated European market.

• European Defence Fund (EDF): This EU fund, while operating outside the formal NATO structure, is a clear industrial policy designed to finance collaborative defense R&D and procurement among EU member states, deliberately favoring European defense contractors.

• Security Action for Europe (SAFE): This EU instrument aims to further incentivize joint procurement and investment in European-made systems. The goal is not just to sell to the U.S., but to build a robust enough European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) that can compete globally and ensure European security regardless of U.S. political decisions.

By strengthening the EDTIB, European elites are attempting to shift the balance of power, ensuring that future NATO requirements are met by systems where Europeans hold the intellectual property and manufacturing control, which in turn gives them greater leverage in the U.S. market.

Success in North American Markets: The Canadian Exception

While the U.S. market remains heavily closed, European efforts to use the NATO framework have been far more successful in Canada.

• Shared European-Canadian Identity: Canada is often viewed by European allies as a partner with less domestic industrial depth than the U.S. and a greater cultural and political affinity for European cooperation.

• Joint Initiatives: The framework of NATO cooperation, combined with increasing EU-Canada defense dialogue, has created a fertile ground for European defense exports to Canada and has even led to Canadian involvement in EU-led projects like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). This demonstrates that where political and regulatory will exists, the NATO framework is highly effective for market opening.

European elites use NATO not merely to "ensure U.S. and allied markets," but to pursue a strategy of conditional integration. They push for military standardization and interoperability because it is essential for collective defense, and they are fully aware this opens up commercial opportunities for their firms.

The extent of their success is highly asymmetrical:

• High Success in securing and integrating the European market and gaining preferential access to the Canadian market through NATO and complementary EU initiatives.

• Low Success in significantly penetrating the vast and highly protected U.S. defense market, which remains guarded by legislative barriers like ITAR.

Ultimately, European efforts within NATO are a strategic dual-play: securing the continent militarily while simultaneously building an integrated industrial base that is robust enough to eventually challenge U.S. dominance and demand true reciprocity in transatlantic defense trade.