— Ubuntu Rooted in Humanity — 

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, allocates billions of naira annually to national security in response to rising threats from Boko Haram, ISWAP, banditry, and other extremist and criminal networks. On paper, these expenditures are intended to fund military operations, intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and community protection initiatives. In practice, however, the efficacy of these budgets is deeply questioned. Reports, whistleblower accounts, and investigative journalism frequently highlight cases where funds intended to fight terrorism disappear through corruption, mismanagement, or politically motivated diversion, leaving communities vulnerable while creating opportunities for elite enrichment.

Understanding whether Nigeria’s security budgets genuinely target terrorism requires examining budget allocations, expenditure patterns, structural weaknesses, and accountability mechanisms, as well as the broader political economy of insecurity.

1. The Scale of Nigeria’s Security Expenditure

Over the past decade, Nigeria has steadily increased its security budget in response to escalating violence. Key allocations include:

• Defense and military operations: Spending on salaries, logistics, equipment, and operations against Boko Haram, ISWAP, and separatist movements.

• Police and paramilitary agencies: Funding for the Nigerian Police Force, Civil Defence Corps, and other enforcement agencies tasked with maintaining law and order.

• Intelligence and counter-terrorism programs: Expenditure on domestic and regional intelligence units, surveillance equipment, and data analytics.

• Emergency response and border security: Funds for rapid response teams, border monitoring, and community policing initiatives.

By 2025, the combined security budget consistently exceeds 10% of Nigeria’s annual national budget, with billions of naira earmarked for both direct combat and preventative measures.

2. Evidence of Misallocation and Corruption

Despite large allocations, on-the-ground effectiveness remains limited, prompting questions about how funds are used. Several patterns emerge:

1. Ghost personnel and inflated payrolls: Investigations have revealed cases where the military and police payroll include “ghost soldiers” and “ghost officers.” Funds allocated to salaries for these non-existent personnel are diverted into private accounts of officials.

2. Procurement irregularities: Contracts for equipment, vehicles, and weaponry are often awarded to politically connected companies without proper tendering, sometimes resulting in substandard arms and vehicles that fail in the field.

3. Delayed or non-existent operations: Budgets often allocate millions for operations in insurgency-affected regions, yet reports indicate months of inaction, suggesting mismanagement or embezzlement of operational funds.

4. Fuel and logistics fraud: Fuel meant for military convoys or camps has been diverted, sold, or stolen, rendering soldiers immobile and ineffective against insurgents.

5. Aid and compensation diversion: Funds intended to support victims of terrorism or IDPs occasionally fail to reach beneficiaries due to intermediaries siphoning resources.

Collectively, these practices erode the capacity of security forces to respond, while allowing corrupt officials and cronies to profit from public funds.

3. Structural Weaknesses Enabling Diversion

Several systemic factors make Nigeria’s security budgets susceptible to diversion:

• Opaque budgeting and oversight: While budgets are publicly approved, the actual disbursement and expenditure tracking is often opaque, with limited real-time auditing.

• Political interference: Military and police leadership sometimes report directly to political patrons rather than independent oversight bodies, creating room for fund manipulation.

• Weak anti-corruption enforcement: Agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) have limited capacity to prosecute high-level diversion of security funds, especially when politically protected elites are involved.

• Fragmented command structures: Multiple security agencies operate under overlapping jurisdictions, complicating accountability and enabling duplication of budgets and off-the-books spending.

These structural weaknesses not only reduce operational efficiency but also sustain a culture of impunity, undermining public trust in security institutions.

4. The Political Economy of Insecurity

In some analyses, insecurity itself has economic and political utility for elites:

• Maintenance of patronage networks: Security budgets can be used to reward political loyalists or fund private militias, often under the guise of counter-terrorism.

• Elite profiteering: Arms procurement, logistics contracts, and personnel payrolls provide ample opportunity for officials and their associates to extract wealth from public funds.

• Electoral manipulation: In regions affected by violence, elite actors may exploit insecurity to influence votes, with security funds indirectly reinforcing control rather than civilian protection.

This dynamic creates a perverse incentive structure where the presence of insecurity may serve as a vehicle for wealth accumulation and political leverage, rather than a signal for urgent national protection.

5. Consequences of Misused Security Budgets

The diversion or mismanagement of funds has profound consequences for the country’s fight against terrorism:

• Ineffective counter-insurgency: Soldiers and officers operate without adequate equipment, supplies, or mobility, leading to failed operations and continued insurgent territorial gains.

• Loss of civilian trust: Communities perceive security forces as inefficient, corrupt, or even complicit, discouraging cooperation and intelligence-sharing.

• Worsening humanitarian crises: IDPs, farmers, traders, and artisans remain vulnerable due to insufficient protection, prolonging displacement and economic loss.

• Economic stagnation: Persistent insecurity discourages foreign investment, slows agricultural and industrial production, and depresses GDP growth.

Ultimately, mismanagement turns a defense expenditure meant to save lives into a drain on national development, benefiting a few while harming millions.

6. Cases Highlighting Mismanagement

Several reports underscore these patterns:

• In the northeastern states, audits revealed ghost soldiers and missing funds meant for operational logistics.

• Investigations into military procurement contracts have found inflated prices for vehicles, equipment, and weapons, with delivery delayed or never fulfilled.

• Whistleblowers have highlighted instances where fuel, rations, and ammunition meant for troops were diverted and sold on the black market.

These examples illustrate that, while billions are allocated annually, the impact on defeating terrorism is far below potential, highlighting the gap between budgeted intent and actual expenditure.

7. Recommendations for Accountability

To ensure security budgets genuinely fight terrorism, several reforms are necessary:

1. Independent auditing: Regular audits of military and police budgets by transparent, independent agencies to track funds and operations.

2. Digital payroll and procurement systems: Reduce ghost soldiers, fake contracts, and middlemen fraud through technology.

3. Civilian oversight: Parliamentary committees, anti-corruption agencies, and civil society should have access to expenditure reports.

4. Whistleblower protection: Encourage reporting of mismanagement without fear of reprisal.

5. Operational transparency: Clear reporting on mission outcomes, budget utilization, and challenges to the public.

Implementing these measures strengthens the link between budget allocations and tangible counter-terrorism results.

8. Between Security and Corruption

Nigeria’s security budgets, while enormous, face a persistent credibility gap. Funds intended to counter terrorism often fail to reach the frontline due to corruption, mismanagement, and political interference. While soldiers and officers may risk their lives under challenging conditions, structural inefficiencies divert billions into private accounts, inflated contracts, and ghost operations.

The result is a vicious cycle: insecurity persists, public trust erodes, and Nigeria’s economy suffers, while a small elite benefits financially and politically. Breaking this cycle requires institutional transparency, rigorous accountability, and the political will to punish diversion, ensuring that public funds serve the lives they were intended to protect.

As Ubuntu reminds us, “I am because we are.” True security spending must reflect this principle: protecting the collective welfare rather than enriching a few at the expense of the many. Only then can Nigeria convert billions spent on paper into effective, life-saving counter-terrorism efforts that restore safety, confidence, and national cohesion.