Substantial friction exists between Washington and European capitals over NATO's funding and strategic priorities, though Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has significantly mitigated the disagreements over military spending.

The core tension has evolved from a simple argument over "who pays" to a complex debate over "what threat to prioritize" and "whose industry benefits."

1. Funding: The Persistent Burden-Sharing Battle

Friction over defense spending, often referred to as "burden-sharing," has been the most visible and consistent source of tension.

The 2% of GDP Target

• Washington's Position: The U.S. has long demanded that all NATO members meet the 2% of GDP defense spending target set at the 2014 Wales Summit, arguing that American taxpayers shoulder an unfairly large share of the alliance's costs. This pressure, most aggressively voiced by the Trump administration, often tied U.S. security commitments to fiscal compliance.

• European Response: Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has been a catalyst for change, leading to historic increases in European defense budgets (e.g., Germany's Zeitenwende). A majority of allies are now meeting or are on track to meet the 2% target. This success has reduced the immediate friction over the original commitment.

• New Friction: The recent success has only shifted the goalposts. The U.S. has begun advocating for a higher minimum target (e.g., 2.5% or even 5% of GDP by 2035), arguing that the current threat level from Russia and the need to resupply Ukraine necessitate a far greater investment. This new, higher target will be a fresh source of tension for countries like Spain and Italy, which still struggle to meet the original 2% commitment.

The "Buying American" vs. "Strategic Autonomy" Divide

Even when Europeans spend more, friction arises over how the money is spent.

• The U.S. Industrial Interest: Washington expects the increased European defense spending to be used to purchase U.S.-made military equipment (e.g., F-35s, Patriot missiles) to ensure interoperability within NATO and support the American defense industrial base. This has been the reality in the short term.

• The European Desire for Autonomy: Major European powers, particularly France, advocate for "European strategic autonomy," which means prioritizing joint European-led defense projects (e.g., the European Defence Fund, PESCO) and purchasing from their own industrial base to foster an independent European capacity. The U.S. views these EU-led initiatives with suspicion, worrying they could discriminate against American companies and ultimately duplicate or undermine NATO. This tension between U.S. market access and European industrial sovereignty remains a fundamental structural conflict.

2. Strategic Priorities: Russia vs. China

A significant and growing source of friction is the disagreement over the alliance's primary strategic focus.

The Washington "Pivot to Asia" Mandate

• U.S. Priority: The U.S. consistently stresses that its greatest long-term geopolitical challenge is the rise of the People's Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific. American policymakers see the need to reallocate significant military and intelligence assets away from the Euro-Atlantic theater to focus on this challenge.

• The Demand: Washington is pushing for NATO to take on a more pronounced, explicit role in countering China’s global security implications and Sino-Russian alignment, particularly in areas like emerging and disruptive technologies, and supply chain resilience.

The European "Russia First" Consensus

• European Priority: For most of Europe, particularly the Eastern Flank (Poland, the Baltic States), Russia remains the clear, immediate, and existential threat. The war in Ukraine has reinforced their view that NATO's primary mission must remain territorial collective defense (Article 5) within Europe.

• The Friction: European capitals are reluctant to allow NATO's limited resources and attention to be excessively diverted toward the Indo-Pacific. They fear that a U.S.-led "pivot to Asia" could weaken deterrence against Russia and leave them vulnerable. The compromise has been to include a brief mention of China's "systemic challenges" in the latest NATO Strategic Concept, but this remains a secondary concern for most European members. This friction creates a strategic imbalance, where the U.S. views its commitment to Europe as a necessary distraction from its main challenge, while Europe views the U.S. commitment to Asia as a potential source of European insecurity.

3. Political Cohesion and Leadership Style

The tone and style of U.S. leadership often generates more political friction than the policy itself.

• Transactional vs. Values-Based: European capitals prefer a values-based, multilateral approach to alliance management, focused on shared democratic principles. In contrast, recent U.S. administrations have, at times, adopted a highly transactional, "America First" approach, using threats of troop withdrawals or questioning the Article 5 commitment to extract higher defense spending. This style of diplomacy—treating the alliance as a financial ledger—causes deep political alienation and trust deficits in Europe.

• Trust and Reliability: A core source of anxiety for Europeans is the long-term reliability of the U.S. security guarantee, particularly in the context of polarized American domestic politics. This uncertainty fuels the European drive for strategic autonomy, not as an act of defiance, but as a necessary hedge against potential U.S. disengagement. This hedging, in turn, is viewed by some in Washington as proof that Europeans are not fully committed to the NATO structure, thus restarting the cycle of friction.

The level of friction between Washington and Europe over NATO is high but manageable under centrist U.S. leadership, thanks to the unifying external threat of Russia. Financial disagreements (2% target) have receded slightly but are being replaced by friction over new, higher targets and industrial policy (buy American vs. buy European). The most persistent and difficult source of friction remains the fundamental divergence in strategic focus—the U.S. sees NATO as a tool to manage the Russian distraction while pivoting to China, whereas Europe sees NATO as the sole guarantor against the Russian threat, viewing the Asian focus as a risky diversion. This complex interplay of funding, industrial, and strategic priorities ensures that high-level transatlantic negotiations will continue to be fraught with tension.