Why the UN and African Union Have Struggled to Stop the Spread of Jihadist Violence Across the Sahel-  
—Ubuntu Rooted in Humanity —

The Sahel region of Africa—stretching from Senegal and Mauritania in the west to Chad and Sudan in the east—has become a hotbed of jihadist violence over the past decade. Groups linked to Al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS), and local insurgents have exploited political instability, economic fragility, and porous borders to expand their influence. Despite the presence of international and regional organizations, including the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), jihadist violence continues to spread, destabilizing communities and undermining state authority. Understanding why these organizations have struggled requires examining structural limitations, political complexities, operational challenges, and systemic vulnerabilities in the region.

1. The Complexity of the Sahelian Threat

The Sahel presents a unique set of challenges for counterterrorism efforts:

• Porous borders: Nomadic populations, informal trade routes, and weak border controls facilitate the movement of militants, weapons, and illicit goods.

• Diverse jihadist networks: The region hosts multiple armed groups, from Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad basin to Al-Qaeda affiliates in Mali and Niger, each with different motivations, strategies, and local alliances.

• Ethnic and communal tensions: Militants exploit intercommunal rivalries, often recruiting marginalized youth in exchange for protection, resources, or ideological appeal.

• Geographical challenges: Vast deserts, remote forests, and rugged terrain hinder surveillance, rapid deployment, and logistical support.

These factors create a highly fluid operational environment that exceeds the capacity of even well-resourced international organizations.

2. Structural Limitations of the UN

The United Nations’ involvement in the Sahel primarily comes through peacekeeping missions and humanitarian support. While well-intentioned, several structural limitations impede effectiveness:

1. Mandate constraints: UN missions such as MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) have limited mandates, often focusing on civilian protection and mediation rather than direct combat. This reduces their ability to proactively engage jihadist groups.

2. Resource limitations: Funding shortfalls, troop shortages, and logistical constraints prevent full coverage of vast operational areas, leaving security gaps that militants exploit.

3. Reliance on contributing nations: UN missions depend on member states for troops, intelligence, and equipment. Variability in training, readiness, and commitment can compromise operational cohesion.

4. Bureaucratic inertia: Slow decision-making, rigid chains of command, and procedural delays reduce responsiveness to rapidly evolving threats.

Even when UN forces intervene effectively, the gains are often temporary, as jihadist groups adapt to new strategies or relocate to unmonitored areas.

3. Challenges within the African Union and Regional Forces

The African Union (AU) and regional blocs, such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force, also face structural and operational hurdles:

• Limited funding and capacity: Unlike international powers, the AU relies on member contributions, which are often delayed, insufficient, or politically contingent. Troops frequently lack modern equipment, intelligence support, and mobility.

• Coordination difficulties: AU missions must work alongside national militaries and UN peacekeepers, creating overlapping jurisdictions and coordination challenges. Misalignment in strategy or communication can reduce operational effectiveness.

• Political constraints: Some member states prioritize sovereignty and domestic political considerations over regional intervention, limiting troop deployment and aggressive action against insurgents.

• Rapidly shifting alliances: Militants exploit local grievances, sometimes co-opting communities to protect themselves from intervention forces, further complicating AU operations.

Thus, the AU struggles to maintain sustained pressure on jihadist groups without robust international support, while simultaneously navigating domestic politics and regional sensitivities.

4. Weak Governance and State Fragility

A critical reason both the UN and AU have struggled is the fragility of local states in the Sahel:

• Corruption and mismanagement: Security forces in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso often suffer from underfunding, low morale, and corruption, reducing their effectiveness in combatting insurgents.

• Ineffective justice systems: Inadequate law enforcement and weak judicial institutions allow militants to operate with relative impunity.

• Political instability: Coups, contested elections, and elite rivalries distract governments from prioritizing counterterrorism.

• Socio-economic marginalization: High poverty, illiteracy, and lack of opportunity make jihadist recruitment appealing to marginalized youth, providing a steady pool of recruits despite international interventions.

No matter how advanced or well-coordinated UN or AU missions are, the underlying weaknesses of local governance undermine long-term security.

5. The Role of External Powers and Geopolitics

Global powers such as France, the U.S., and increasingly China influence UN and AU operations, creating both opportunities and complications:

• France’s military interventions (e.g., Operation Barkhane) provide tactical support but sometimes generate local resentment, reducing the legitimacy of AU and UN forces.

• U.S. drone operations and intelligence sharing enhance surveillance and targeting but do not address socio-economic drivers of extremism.

• Geopolitical competition among global powers can lead to fragmented strategies, inconsistent priorities, or conditional support that limits AU and UN effectiveness.

In other words, external intervention often complements but cannot substitute for local governance and social resilience.

6. Ideological Adaptation of Jihadist Groups

Jihadist networks in the Sahel are highly adaptive, undermining the impact of external and regional interventions:

• Decentralized command: Groups operate in small, mobile cells, making them difficult to target with conventional forces.

• Community integration: Militants often integrate into local populations, providing protection, services, or income in exchange for support, complicating identification.

• Ideological flexibility: Groups adapt their messaging to exploit local grievances, ensuring recruitment despite counterterrorism campaigns.

• Cross-border mobility: With weak border enforcement, militants relocate rapidly, avoiding pressure from military operations.

These adaptive strategies outpace traditional peacekeeping and regional military models, making containment difficult.

7. Structural, Political, and Operational Hurdles

The failure of the UN and African Union to stop the spread of jihadist violence in the Sahel is not simply a matter of insufficient will; it reflects structural, operational, and political challenges that limit their capacity:

1. Vast, difficult terrain and porous borders facilitate militant mobility.

2. Mandate limitations, funding gaps, and coordination challenges constrain UN and AU missions.

3. Weak governance, corruption, and political instability in Sahelian states reduce the effectiveness of local security forces.

4. Jihadist networks are decentralized, adaptive, and socially embedded, making traditional military interventions insufficient.

5. External geopolitical interests sometimes fragment strategic coherence, prioritizing tactical gains over long-term stabilization.

Addressing these challenges requires a holistic strategy that goes beyond military intervention. It must combine:

• Strengthened local governance and accountability.

• Socio-economic development to reduce recruitment pools.

• Intelligence-driven, community-based security operations.

• Coordination between regional forces, the UN, AU, and international partners.

Until these structural, political, and social deficits are addressed, jihadist violence will continue to exploit the gaps, and international efforts, though well-intentioned, will remain only partially effective.

Ubuntu reminds us: “I am because we are.” Sustainable peace in the Sahel depends on empowering local communities, building resilient institutions, and aligning global support with the needs and agency of the people who live amid the conflict, rather than relying solely on external military power.