European elites consistently frame climate security, cybersecurity, and energy security as being instrumental to NATO’s core task of collective defense, not just supplementary policy areas.

They leverage the concept of "resilience" to argue that these non-traditional domains are essential to a nation’s ability to resist, endure, and rapidly recover from any modern attack, thereby expanding NATO's mission without formally challenging the primacy of Article 5.

I. Framing Climate Security: The "Threat Multiplier" and Operational Resilience

European elites, particularly from nations like Germany, France, and the Nordic countries, have spearheaded the integration of climate change into NATO's political and military agenda. Their framing is based on two key pillars:

1. Climate Change as a "Threat Multiplier"

This is the primary political frame. Elites argue that climate change does not merely create environmental problems; it exacerbates existing security risks in regions of strategic interest to NATO.

• Instability in the South: They point to issues like drought, desertification, and resource scarcity in North Africa and the Middle East as drivers of mass migration, failed states, and local conflicts. Instability in these regions inevitably affects European security through refugee flows, organized crime, and terrorist group activity. By identifying climate change as a root cause, NATO's role is expanded from simply managing consequences (e.g., counter-terrorism) to anticipating and mitigating causes (e.g., funding capacity-building in vulnerable partners).

• Arctic Competition: Climate change opens new sea lanes and resource exploitation opportunities in the Arctic. European allies (especially Norway and Denmark) frame this as a direct trigger for increased geopolitical competition with Russia and China. This justification makes the Arctic—and climate monitoring within it—a vital area for NATO's deterrence and defense posture, rather than just an environmental concern.

2. Operational and Military Adaptation

European security thinkers emphasize that climate change directly impacts the Alliance's military effectiveness and preparedness, thereby warranting an institutional NATO response.

• Degradation of Infrastructure: Extreme weather events (floods, heatwaves) compromise military bases, command centers, and critical infrastructure (roads, ports) necessary for deploying and sustaining troops. Climate security becomes a matter of "climate-proofing" NATO's defense posture and supply lines.

• Decarbonization for Advantage: Elites advocate for reducing military greenhouse gas emissions (a commitment in the 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan) not just for environmental reasons, but for operational advantage. Less reliance on fossil fuels means more efficient logistics, fewer vulnerabilities in the supply chain (e.g., reducing the need for vulnerable fuel convoys), and a stronger image as a modern, forward-looking force.

II. Framing Cybersecurity: The "Fifth Domain" and Article 5 Trigger

The European framing of cybersecurity, strongly backed by the US, is the most direct method used to expand NATO’s mission into a non-traditional domain, fundamentally altering the definition of conflict.

1. Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations

The crucial elite consensus achieved in the last decade is the recognition of cyberspace as an operational domain (alongside land, sea, air, and space).

• NATO as the Ultimate Cyber Protector: By establishing cyberspace as a domain, European elites ensure that cyber defense falls under NATO's collective defense umbrella. This mandates that the Alliance must develop military-grade capabilities, command structures, and intelligence-sharing mechanisms to operate and defend within it.

• The Article 5 Threshold: The most significant step was the consensus that a significant malicious cumulative cyber activity might, in certain circumstances, be considered an armed attack that could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5. This political-diplomatic framing elevates cyber-aggression from a matter of national law enforcement to a collective military crisis, thereby formalizing and institutionalizing NATO's role in cyber defense at the highest possible level.

2. Resilience and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)

Following the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, European elites focused on cyberattacks targeting civilian infrastructure as a direct threat to the military mission.

• Civilian-Military Interdependence: Modern European societies are highly digitized. A successful cyberattack on a national power grid, transport network, or financial system would severely impede a country's ability to mobilize and sustain military forces for collective defense. The elite argument is that national and collective resilience are inextricably linked.

• EU-NATO Cooperation: This shared challenge has been framed as the perfect case for cooperation between the EU (which manages civilian and regulatory aspects) and NATO (which handles military defense). The creation of the EU-NATO Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure institutionalizes the Alliance's involvement in protecting civilian, cross-border assets—a significant expansion of its traditional defensive mandate.

III. Framing Energy Security: From Economic Interest to Strategic Vulnerability

NATO initially resisted deep involvement in energy security, viewing it as an economic issue best left to the EU. However, European elites, particularly after Russia’s weaponization of energy, successfully framed it as a direct strategic vulnerability that threatens deterrence.

1. Energy Supply as a Military Requirement

The argument is simple: military power runs on energy. A lack of secure, diverse, and resilient energy sources directly compromises a nation’s ability to defend itself.

• Reliable Military Logistics: NATO forces, especially those deployed to the Eastern Flank, rely on civilian energy and fuel networks. If these supplies are disrupted, the military mission is compromised. Energy security thus becomes a matter of military readiness and force projection.

• Strategic Awareness: European leaders advocate for NATO to enhance its strategic awareness of energy developments. This means using NATO's intelligence-sharing and consultation mechanisms to monitor gas pipelines, oil transit routes, and the security of key energy producers and transit states. This intelligence function is critical for informing military planning and anticipating crises.

2. Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI)

The physical security of energy assets, especially after incidents like the pipeline sabotage and ongoing Russian threats, is now firmly framed as a NATO concern.

• Collective Defense of CEI: While protection is primarily a national responsibility, European nations pushed for NATO to play a coordinating and supporting role in the protection of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI), such as subsea gas pipelines and data cables. This has led to the establishment of the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at NATO's military headquarters (MARCOM), transforming a maritime security concern into a strategic deterrence mission to prevent hybrid attacks.

In summary, the expansion of NATO's mission into climate, cyber, and energy security is not presented as "mission creep," but rather as necessary adaptation to a new threat environment. European elites successfully tie these novel challenges back to the Alliance's founding purpose—the defense and security of its members—by emphasizing the concept of resilience as the indispensable backbone of modern collective defense.