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  • Shia Yassarnal Quran Qaida Course is an introductory book of the Quran. Because this book helps to follow the rules of reciting the Quran, it is helpful for early Quran readers. Shia Seminary offers this course for both kids and adults.
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    Shia Yassarnal Quran Qaida Course is an introductory book of the Quran. Because this book helps to follow the rules of reciting the Quran, it is helpful for early Quran readers. Shia Seminary offers this course for both kids and adults. Website: https://shiaseminary.com/courses/yassarnal-quran-qaida-course-online/ WhatsApp: +92-321- 8475998 Feel free to contact us any time. #yassarnalquran #shiayassarnalquran #shiayassarnalquranonline #onlineshiayassarnalquran #shiaonlineyassarnalquran #yassarnalquranqaidaonline #shiaqaidaonline #shiaonlineqaida #onlineshiaqaida #shiaquranqaidaonline #USA #unitedstatesofamerica #australia #germany #Italy #France #Canada #Scotland #Wales #NorthernIreland #Kuwait #unitedarabemirates #uae #bahrain #Oman #Jordan #newzealand #singapore #bulgaria #brunei #libya #austria #unitedkingdom
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    Shia Yassarnal Quran Qaida Course Online for Kids & Adults
    Shia Yassarnal Quran Qaida Course Online for Kids and Adults. The program will help you to read the Arabic letters and words of the Holy Book
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  • Join Our Online Quran Center for the Holy Quran and Essential Religious Teachings Via Online Quran Classes. We offer our education services Worldwide. For More details and Information you can visit:
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    Join Our Online Quran Center for the Holy Quran and Essential Religious Teachings Via Online Quran Classes. We offer our education services Worldwide. For More details and Information you can visit: Website: https://shiaseminary.com WhatsApp: +92-321- 8475998 Feel free to contact us any time. #ShiaOnlineQuranCenter #ShiaOnlineQuranAcademy #ShiaOnlineQuranInstitute #ShiaQuranMadrasa #ShiaOnlineQuranSeminary #USA #unitedstatesofamerica #australia #germany #Italy #France #Canada #Scotland #Wales #NorthernIreland #Kuwait #unitedarabemirates #uae #bahrain #Oman #Jordan #newzealand #singapore #bulgaria #brunei #libya #austria #unitedkingdom
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    Shia Quran Academy | Center | Institute Online for Kids & Adults
    Online Shia Quran Academy, Center, Institute for kids & adults Worldwide. Ahle Tashi Islamic Fiqh Educational E-Learning platform, Free Trial
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  • Who are the sponsors of wars in Congo, Sudan and South-Sudan?
    Chad, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, UAE and Iran are directly and indirectly involved in the wars in these countries.

    Why are there no protest in European elite countries and America against these war sponsors in Africa?

    External Interests and Rivalries Fueling Conflicts in Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan:-

    Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and South Sudan are complex, protracted conflicts with deep internal roots, yet significantly inflamed and sustained by a web of external state and non-state actors. These sponsors, driven by diverse geopolitical, economic, and security interests, provide financial, military, and political support to various factions, often exacerbating instability and prolonging the suffering of civilian populations.

    Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): A History of Regional Meddling and Resource Exploitation

    The long-standing conflicts in the DRC, particularly in its eastern regions, have been marked by extensive foreign interference. Neighboring countries Rwanda and Uganda have been repeatedly accused by UN experts and international observers of backing rebel groups, most notably the M23. This support allegedly includes direct military intervention, arms provision, and financial assistance. Their motivations are often linked to their own security concerns, such as combating hostile armed groups operating from Congolese territory, and significant economic interests, particularly the lucrative trade in minerals like gold, coltan, and diamonds.

    Other regional powers have also been involved. Burundi has reportedly sent troops into the DRC, at times allied with the Congolese army and at others with interests that align with or counter Rwandan and Ugandan objectives. Historically, countries like Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia intervened in past Congo wars, supporting different sides of the conflict.

    Beyond immediate neighbors, wider international interests are at play. While less direct in recent frontline combat, historical involvement from countries like France, Belgium (the former colonial power), the United States, and China has shaped the political and economic landscape. Regional blocs such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) have deployed forces with mandates to stabilize the region, though their efforts are often complicated by the intricate network of alliances and rivalries. The draw of the DRC's vast natural resources continues to be a significant magnet for various international corporations and shadowy networks, whose activities can indirectly fuel conflict.

    Sudan: A Vicious Power Struggle Entangled with Foreign Agendas

    The devastating conflict that erupted in Sudan in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) quickly drew in external sponsors. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been widely implicated as a key backer of the RSF, allegedly supplying weapons, drones, and financial aid. This support is seen as part of the UAE's broader strategy to project influence in the Red Sea region and secure economic interests, including gold mining operations largely controlled by the RSF.


    Conversely, Egypt has a long-standing relationship with the Sudanese military establishment and is reported to be a primary supporter of the SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Cairo views a stable, military-led Sudan as crucial for its own national security, particularly concerning border stability and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam upstream on the Blue Nile.


    Iran has also emerged as a notable supporter of the SAF, reportedly providing drones and other military assistance. This marks a renewal of ties and is viewed by some analysts as an effort by Tehran to counter regional rivals and expand its influence in a strategically important area.

    Russia, primarily through the activities of the Wagner Group (now rebranded), has established a footprint in Sudan, focusing on gold mining concessions and security arrangements. While initially appearing to cultivate ties with both factions, recent reports suggest a potential alignment with Iran in supporting the SAF, though its overarching goal remains securing access to resources and projecting power.

    Other regional actors, including Chad and elements within Libya (specifically Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army), have been accused of facilitating support for the RSF. Saudi Arabia and Turkey also hold significant political and economic interests in Sudan and have engaged with various parties, though their direct military sponsorship in the current conflict is less clear-cut than that of the UAE, Egypt, or Iran.

    South Sudan: Civil War Compounded by Regional Rivalries and Resource Politics

    The civil war that plagued South Sudan from 2013, shortly after its independence, also saw significant external involvement. Uganda openly deployed its troops in support of President Salva Kiir's government against rebel factions led by Riek Machar, playing a crucial role in preventing the government's collapse in the early stages of the war.

    The conflict in neighboring Sudan has more recently had a direct impact on South Sudan's internal dynamics and external alignments. President Kiir's government has reportedly sought closer ties with the UAE and the RSF in Sudan to safeguard South Sudan's critical oil exports, much of which transits through Sudan and areas under RSF influence. This has potentially strained relations with the SAF, which, in turn, has been accused of reactivating ties with opposition groups within South Sudan.


    Regional bodies, particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have been central to mediation efforts, often with the backing of the "Troika" – the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway. However, neighboring countries like Sudan (prior to its current internal conflict), Kenya, and Ethiopia have also been described as "financiers" or "regulators" of the conflict, at times providing material support to different factions or leveraging their influence in peace negotiations to serve their own strategic and economic interests. The control and revenue from South Sudan's substantial oil reserves remain a critical factor influencing both internal power struggles and external involvement.

    In conclusion, the wars in the DRC, Sudan, and South Sudan are fueled by a dangerous confluence of internal grievances and external interference. A multitude of state and non-state actors, driven by a complex array of geopolitical ambitions, security concerns, and economic opportunism – particularly the exploitation of vast natural resources – continue to sponsor various warring parties. This external involvement often undermines peace efforts, prolongs the conflicts, and deepens the humanitarian crises afflicting these nations.


    By Jo Ikeji-Uju
    https://afriprime.net/pages/Anything
    Who are the sponsors of wars in Congo, Sudan and South-Sudan? Chad, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, UAE and Iran are directly and indirectly involved in the wars in these countries. Why are there no protest in European elite countries and America against these war sponsors in Africa? External Interests and Rivalries Fueling Conflicts in Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan:- Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and South Sudan are complex, protracted conflicts with deep internal roots, yet significantly inflamed and sustained by a web of external state and non-state actors. These sponsors, driven by diverse geopolitical, economic, and security interests, provide financial, military, and political support to various factions, often exacerbating instability and prolonging the suffering of civilian populations. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): A History of Regional Meddling and Resource Exploitation The long-standing conflicts in the DRC, particularly in its eastern regions, have been marked by extensive foreign interference. Neighboring countries Rwanda and Uganda have been repeatedly accused by UN experts and international observers of backing rebel groups, most notably the M23. This support allegedly includes direct military intervention, arms provision, and financial assistance. Their motivations are often linked to their own security concerns, such as combating hostile armed groups operating from Congolese territory, and significant economic interests, particularly the lucrative trade in minerals like gold, coltan, and diamonds. Other regional powers have also been involved. Burundi has reportedly sent troops into the DRC, at times allied with the Congolese army and at others with interests that align with or counter Rwandan and Ugandan objectives. Historically, countries like Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia intervened in past Congo wars, supporting different sides of the conflict. Beyond immediate neighbors, wider international interests are at play. While less direct in recent frontline combat, historical involvement from countries like France, Belgium (the former colonial power), the United States, and China has shaped the political and economic landscape. Regional blocs such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) have deployed forces with mandates to stabilize the region, though their efforts are often complicated by the intricate network of alliances and rivalries. The draw of the DRC's vast natural resources continues to be a significant magnet for various international corporations and shadowy networks, whose activities can indirectly fuel conflict. Sudan: A Vicious Power Struggle Entangled with Foreign Agendas The devastating conflict that erupted in Sudan in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) quickly drew in external sponsors. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been widely implicated as a key backer of the RSF, allegedly supplying weapons, drones, and financial aid. This support is seen as part of the UAE's broader strategy to project influence in the Red Sea region and secure economic interests, including gold mining operations largely controlled by the RSF. Conversely, Egypt has a long-standing relationship with the Sudanese military establishment and is reported to be a primary supporter of the SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Cairo views a stable, military-led Sudan as crucial for its own national security, particularly concerning border stability and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam upstream on the Blue Nile. Iran has also emerged as a notable supporter of the SAF, reportedly providing drones and other military assistance. This marks a renewal of ties and is viewed by some analysts as an effort by Tehran to counter regional rivals and expand its influence in a strategically important area. Russia, primarily through the activities of the Wagner Group (now rebranded), has established a footprint in Sudan, focusing on gold mining concessions and security arrangements. While initially appearing to cultivate ties with both factions, recent reports suggest a potential alignment with Iran in supporting the SAF, though its overarching goal remains securing access to resources and projecting power. Other regional actors, including Chad and elements within Libya (specifically Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army), have been accused of facilitating support for the RSF. Saudi Arabia and Turkey also hold significant political and economic interests in Sudan and have engaged with various parties, though their direct military sponsorship in the current conflict is less clear-cut than that of the UAE, Egypt, or Iran. South Sudan: Civil War Compounded by Regional Rivalries and Resource Politics The civil war that plagued South Sudan from 2013, shortly after its independence, also saw significant external involvement. Uganda openly deployed its troops in support of President Salva Kiir's government against rebel factions led by Riek Machar, playing a crucial role in preventing the government's collapse in the early stages of the war. The conflict in neighboring Sudan has more recently had a direct impact on South Sudan's internal dynamics and external alignments. President Kiir's government has reportedly sought closer ties with the UAE and the RSF in Sudan to safeguard South Sudan's critical oil exports, much of which transits through Sudan and areas under RSF influence. This has potentially strained relations with the SAF, which, in turn, has been accused of reactivating ties with opposition groups within South Sudan. Regional bodies, particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have been central to mediation efforts, often with the backing of the "Troika" – the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway. However, neighboring countries like Sudan (prior to its current internal conflict), Kenya, and Ethiopia have also been described as "financiers" or "regulators" of the conflict, at times providing material support to different factions or leveraging their influence in peace negotiations to serve their own strategic and economic interests. The control and revenue from South Sudan's substantial oil reserves remain a critical factor influencing both internal power struggles and external involvement. In conclusion, the wars in the DRC, Sudan, and South Sudan are fueled by a dangerous confluence of internal grievances and external interference. A multitude of state and non-state actors, driven by a complex array of geopolitical ambitions, security concerns, and economic opportunism – particularly the exploitation of vast natural resources – continue to sponsor various warring parties. This external involvement often undermines peace efforts, prolongs the conflicts, and deepens the humanitarian crises afflicting these nations. By Jo Ikeji-Uju https://afriprime.net/pages/Anything
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  • Who are the sponsors of terrorist group in Africa?
    The idea that "Europeans and America sponsor most terrorist organizations in Africa" is a strong accusation that reflects a profound loss of trust and a widely held belief among many Africans, especially the youth.

    While direct, explicit sponsorship of terrorist organizations by Western governments is not what official reports or governments claim, the perception here describe stems from a complex interplay of factors:

    Roots of this Perception:
    Historical Context of Intervention:
    Proxy Wars and Cold War Legacies: During the Cold War, both Western and Eastern blocs supported various factions (some of which engaged in violence) across Africa to advance their ideological and strategic interests, often without regard for long-term consequences. This history contributes to the belief that external powers manipulate internal conflicts.

    Interventions and Their Aftermath: Western interventions, even those framed as counter-terrorism efforts, have sometimes led to unintended consequences, including destabilization, the rise of new extremist groups, or the weakening of existing state structures, inadvertently creating vacuums that terrorist groups exploit. The distabilisation in Libya, for example, is often cited as a major contributor to the proliferation of arms and instability across the Sahel.

    Perceived Ineffectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Efforts:
    Despite significant Western military presence, training, and financial aid directed at counter-terrorism, terrorist activity in regions like the Sahel has increased in frequency and deadliness.
    This leads many to question the true efficacy and intentions behind these interventions.
    If Western powers are genuinely fighting terrorism, why does it seem to be getting worse?

    This perceived failure fuels suspicions that there's either incompetence, or worse, a deliberate strategy that benefits from continued instability.

    Allegations of Double Standards and Geopolitical Games:
    Many Africans observe what they perceive as selective engagement or "double standards" from Western powers.

    They may see Western countries condemning certain armed groups while tacitly or overtly supporting others that align with their strategic interests, even if those groups also engage in violence.
    The truth that Western powers benefit from chaos, perhaps to maintain access to resources or to prevent strong, independent African states from emerging, gains traction in this context.

    Local Grievances and Western Ties to Unpopular Regimes:
    Terrorist groups often exploit genuine local grievances, such as poverty, corruption, marginalization, and ineffective governance.

    When Western powers are seen to be supporting regimes that are unpopular or perceived as corrupt, it can indirectly fuel anti-Western sentiment and make it easier for extremist groups to recruit by positioning themselves as fighting against both the local government and its foreign backers.

    The coups in the Sahel, often popular among the youth, frequently cite the failure of previous governments to address insecurity and economic woes, and explicitly blame Western partners for being part of the problem.

    Information Warfare and Alternative source of spreading news:
    The rise of social media and the presence of other global actors (like Russia, through state-backed media or private military companies) actively promoting anti-Western narratives have amplified these suspicions. These sources often capitalize on existing frustrations and historical grievances to paint a picture of deliberate Western manipulation.

    Impact on Trust:
    The perception you describe is indeed a significant factor in the breakdown of trust between many African populations and Western nations.

    This loss of trust manifests in:
    Public support for anti-Western leaders: Leaders who openly challenge Western influence gain significant popular backing.

    Rejection of Western military presence: Calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops are becoming more frequent and forceful.

    Openness to alternative partnerships: African nations are increasingly looking to China, Russia, Turkey, and other countries for security, economic, and political cooperation.

    Difficulty in genuine cooperation: Even when Western nations offer assistance, it can be viewed with suspicion, hindering effective collaboration on critical issues.
    It's a challenging situation, as from a Western perspective, the efforts are often framed as genuine attempts to combat terrorism and foster stability.

    However, the lived experience and perception on the ground in many African countries, shaped by history, geopolitical dynamics, and the persistent presence of insecurity, lead to a very different and deeply cynical conclusion about Western intentions. This disconnect is a major hurdle for future relations.

    By Jo Ikeji-Uju
    https://afriprime.net/pages/Anything
    Who are the sponsors of terrorist group in Africa? The idea that "Europeans and America sponsor most terrorist organizations in Africa" is a strong accusation that reflects a profound loss of trust and a widely held belief among many Africans, especially the youth. While direct, explicit sponsorship of terrorist organizations by Western governments is not what official reports or governments claim, the perception here describe stems from a complex interplay of factors: Roots of this Perception: Historical Context of Intervention: Proxy Wars and Cold War Legacies: During the Cold War, both Western and Eastern blocs supported various factions (some of which engaged in violence) across Africa to advance their ideological and strategic interests, often without regard for long-term consequences. This history contributes to the belief that external powers manipulate internal conflicts. Interventions and Their Aftermath: Western interventions, even those framed as counter-terrorism efforts, have sometimes led to unintended consequences, including destabilization, the rise of new extremist groups, or the weakening of existing state structures, inadvertently creating vacuums that terrorist groups exploit. The distabilisation in Libya, for example, is often cited as a major contributor to the proliferation of arms and instability across the Sahel. Perceived Ineffectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Despite significant Western military presence, training, and financial aid directed at counter-terrorism, terrorist activity in regions like the Sahel has increased in frequency and deadliness. This leads many to question the true efficacy and intentions behind these interventions. If Western powers are genuinely fighting terrorism, why does it seem to be getting worse? This perceived failure fuels suspicions that there's either incompetence, or worse, a deliberate strategy that benefits from continued instability. Allegations of Double Standards and Geopolitical Games: Many Africans observe what they perceive as selective engagement or "double standards" from Western powers. They may see Western countries condemning certain armed groups while tacitly or overtly supporting others that align with their strategic interests, even if those groups also engage in violence. The truth that Western powers benefit from chaos, perhaps to maintain access to resources or to prevent strong, independent African states from emerging, gains traction in this context. Local Grievances and Western Ties to Unpopular Regimes: Terrorist groups often exploit genuine local grievances, such as poverty, corruption, marginalization, and ineffective governance. When Western powers are seen to be supporting regimes that are unpopular or perceived as corrupt, it can indirectly fuel anti-Western sentiment and make it easier for extremist groups to recruit by positioning themselves as fighting against both the local government and its foreign backers. The coups in the Sahel, often popular among the youth, frequently cite the failure of previous governments to address insecurity and economic woes, and explicitly blame Western partners for being part of the problem. Information Warfare and Alternative source of spreading news: The rise of social media and the presence of other global actors (like Russia, through state-backed media or private military companies) actively promoting anti-Western narratives have amplified these suspicions. These sources often capitalize on existing frustrations and historical grievances to paint a picture of deliberate Western manipulation. Impact on Trust: The perception you describe is indeed a significant factor in the breakdown of trust between many African populations and Western nations. This loss of trust manifests in: Public support for anti-Western leaders: Leaders who openly challenge Western influence gain significant popular backing. Rejection of Western military presence: Calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops are becoming more frequent and forceful. Openness to alternative partnerships: African nations are increasingly looking to China, Russia, Turkey, and other countries for security, economic, and political cooperation. Difficulty in genuine cooperation: Even when Western nations offer assistance, it can be viewed with suspicion, hindering effective collaboration on critical issues. It's a challenging situation, as from a Western perspective, the efforts are often framed as genuine attempts to combat terrorism and foster stability. However, the lived experience and perception on the ground in many African countries, shaped by history, geopolitical dynamics, and the persistent presence of insecurity, lead to a very different and deeply cynical conclusion about Western intentions. This disconnect is a major hurdle for future relations. By Jo Ikeji-Uju https://afriprime.net/pages/Anything
    AFRIPRIME.NET
    Anything Goes
    Share your memories, connect with others, make new friends
    0 Reacties 0 aandelen 2K Views 0 voorbeeld
  • ## Key Actors and Methods in the Financing of Islamic Extremism in Nigeria and West Africa

    Islamic extremist groups operating in Nigeria and the broader West African region, notably Boko Haram factions (including JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), alongside Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Sahel, sustain their activities through a complex and multifaceted network of financial and material support. Funding sources range from localized criminal activities and resource exploitation to international financial networks and support from global extremist organizations.

    **Key Funding Mechanisms:**

    * **Criminal Activities:** A primary revenue stream for these groups is direct criminal enterprise. This includes:
    * **Kidnapping for Ransom:** A highly lucrative tactic, targeting both locals and foreigners, generating significant income.
    * **Extortion and Taxation:** Imposing levies on local populations, businesses, and economic activities (such as farming, fishing, and trade) in areas under their control or influence. For instance, ISWAP is known to tax the lucrative fish and red pepper trade in the Lake Chad Basin.
    * **Bank Robberies and Looting:** Direct attacks on financial institutions and pillaging of communities.
    * **Trafficking:** Involvement in various forms of trafficking, including arms, drugs, and humans, often leveraging porous borders and existing criminal networks.
    * **Exploitation of Natural Resources:** Extremist groups exploit natural resources in areas they operate. This includes:
    * **Illegal Mining:** Particularly of gold in regions like the Sahel. Groups like JNIM have been linked to the control and taxation of artisanal gold mining sites.
    * **Control of Agricultural and Fishing Economies:** As seen with Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin, controlling and taxing these local industries provides substantial revenue.
    * **Local Support Networks:**
    * **Wealthy Sympathizers and Professionals:** Reports suggest that some local politicians, religious sympathizers, and wealthy professionals provide financial support to these groups, sometimes through "protection money."
    * **Bureau De Change Operators:** The Nigerian government has identified and arrested Bureau De Change operators involved in facilitating financial transactions for extremist groups.
    * **International Support and Networks:**
    * **ISIS Core Support to ISWAP:** ISWAP, as an affiliate of the Islamic State, reportedly receives financial backing from the ISIS core. This includes alleged monthly payments to fighters and funds to support governance-like activities in areas ISWAP controls.
    * **Foreign Donations and Remittances:** While often opaque, foreign donations and remittances from sympathizers abroad contribute to funding. These may be channeled through informal money transfer systems (like hawalas) or disguised through charitable organizations.
    * **Specific International Financing Cells:** A notable case involved a Boko Haram financing cell based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Six Nigerian individuals were convicted in the UAE and subsequently sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for establishing this cell, which funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to Boko Haram in Nigeria. Individuals like Abdurrahman Ado Musa were central to this network.
    * **Alleged Al-Qaeda Links:** Historically, Boko Haram was reported to have received initial funding from Al-Qaeda. While current direct financial ties are less clear, ideological affiliations and potential connections with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its successor JNIM remain a factor in the regional extremist landscape.

    **Identified Individuals and Entities:**

    * **Nigerian Government Actions:** The Nigerian government has arrested and sanctioned individuals suspected of terrorism financing. For instance, **Abdurrahaman Musa Ado** was designated by Nigeria's Sanctions Committee as a terrorist financier. The government has also spoken of uncovering a significant funding ring involving numerous individuals and businesses.
    * **U.S. Sanctions:** The United States has designated several individuals for supporting Boko Haram. Notably, six Nigerians linked to the UAE-based financing cell were sanctioned:
    * **Abdurrahman Ado Musa**
    * **Salihu Yusuf Adamu**
    * **Bashir Ali Yusuf**
    * **Muhammed Ibrahim Isa**
    * **Ibrahim Ali Alhassan**
    * **Surajo Abubakar Muhammad**
    These individuals were found guilty of transferring significant funds from Dubai to Boko Haram in Nigeria.
    * **Global Terrorist Organizations:** ISWAP is an officially recognized affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), and JNIM is aligned with Al-Qaeda. This affiliation implies a degree of command, control, and potentially material and financial support from these global entities, as evidenced by ISIS's financial backing of ISWAP.

    **Challenges in Countering Terrorism Financing:**

    Despite efforts by national governments and international bodies like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the United Nations, disrupting terrorist financing in the region remains a significant challenge. These challenges include:

    * **Cash-Based Economies:** The prevalence of informal, cash-based economies makes tracking illicit financial flows difficult.
    * **Porous Borders:** Weak border security facilitates the movement of cash, goods, and individuals involved in illicit activities.
    * **Difficult Terrain and Ungoverned Spaces:** Large, remote, and often ungoverned or poorly governed areas provide safe havens for extremist groups to operate and generate funds.
    * **Difficulties in Prosecution:** Even when financiers are identified, securing convictions can be challenging due to legal and evidentiary hurdles.
    * **Adaptability of Terrorist Groups:** Extremist groups continually adapt their financing methods to circumvent counter-terrorism measures.

    **State Sponsors:**

    While specific states are not consistently and publicly named by international bodies as direct, ongoing sponsors of Islamic extremist groups in Nigeria and West Africa in the same vein as global state sponsorship designations, the complex geopolitical landscape means external influences and historic interventions (like the situation in Libya) are sometimes cited as contributing factors to regional instability that extremist groups exploit. The primary identified external financial support comes from transnational terrorist organizations like ISIS and networks of individuals, rather than direct state sponsorship in most public accounts.

    In conclusion, the financing of Islamic extremism in Nigeria and West Africa is a multifaceted issue, deeply intertwined with local criminal economies, regional instability, and international extremist networks. Efforts to counter this require a comprehensive approach that addresses both the local drivers of funding and the transnational financial flows supporting these groups.
    ## Key Actors and Methods in the Financing of Islamic Extremism in Nigeria and West Africa Islamic extremist groups operating in Nigeria and the broader West African region, notably Boko Haram factions (including JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), alongside Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Sahel, sustain their activities through a complex and multifaceted network of financial and material support. Funding sources range from localized criminal activities and resource exploitation to international financial networks and support from global extremist organizations. **Key Funding Mechanisms:** * **Criminal Activities:** A primary revenue stream for these groups is direct criminal enterprise. This includes: * **Kidnapping for Ransom:** A highly lucrative tactic, targeting both locals and foreigners, generating significant income. * **Extortion and Taxation:** Imposing levies on local populations, businesses, and economic activities (such as farming, fishing, and trade) in areas under their control or influence. For instance, ISWAP is known to tax the lucrative fish and red pepper trade in the Lake Chad Basin. * **Bank Robberies and Looting:** Direct attacks on financial institutions and pillaging of communities. * **Trafficking:** Involvement in various forms of trafficking, including arms, drugs, and humans, often leveraging porous borders and existing criminal networks. * **Exploitation of Natural Resources:** Extremist groups exploit natural resources in areas they operate. This includes: * **Illegal Mining:** Particularly of gold in regions like the Sahel. Groups like JNIM have been linked to the control and taxation of artisanal gold mining sites. * **Control of Agricultural and Fishing Economies:** As seen with Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin, controlling and taxing these local industries provides substantial revenue. * **Local Support Networks:** * **Wealthy Sympathizers and Professionals:** Reports suggest that some local politicians, religious sympathizers, and wealthy professionals provide financial support to these groups, sometimes through "protection money." * **Bureau De Change Operators:** The Nigerian government has identified and arrested Bureau De Change operators involved in facilitating financial transactions for extremist groups. * **International Support and Networks:** * **ISIS Core Support to ISWAP:** ISWAP, as an affiliate of the Islamic State, reportedly receives financial backing from the ISIS core. This includes alleged monthly payments to fighters and funds to support governance-like activities in areas ISWAP controls. * **Foreign Donations and Remittances:** While often opaque, foreign donations and remittances from sympathizers abroad contribute to funding. These may be channeled through informal money transfer systems (like hawalas) or disguised through charitable organizations. * **Specific International Financing Cells:** A notable case involved a Boko Haram financing cell based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Six Nigerian individuals were convicted in the UAE and subsequently sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for establishing this cell, which funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to Boko Haram in Nigeria. Individuals like Abdurrahman Ado Musa were central to this network. * **Alleged Al-Qaeda Links:** Historically, Boko Haram was reported to have received initial funding from Al-Qaeda. While current direct financial ties are less clear, ideological affiliations and potential connections with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its successor JNIM remain a factor in the regional extremist landscape. **Identified Individuals and Entities:** * **Nigerian Government Actions:** The Nigerian government has arrested and sanctioned individuals suspected of terrorism financing. For instance, **Abdurrahaman Musa Ado** was designated by Nigeria's Sanctions Committee as a terrorist financier. The government has also spoken of uncovering a significant funding ring involving numerous individuals and businesses. * **U.S. Sanctions:** The United States has designated several individuals for supporting Boko Haram. Notably, six Nigerians linked to the UAE-based financing cell were sanctioned: * **Abdurrahman Ado Musa** * **Salihu Yusuf Adamu** * **Bashir Ali Yusuf** * **Muhammed Ibrahim Isa** * **Ibrahim Ali Alhassan** * **Surajo Abubakar Muhammad** These individuals were found guilty of transferring significant funds from Dubai to Boko Haram in Nigeria. * **Global Terrorist Organizations:** ISWAP is an officially recognized affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), and JNIM is aligned with Al-Qaeda. This affiliation implies a degree of command, control, and potentially material and financial support from these global entities, as evidenced by ISIS's financial backing of ISWAP. **Challenges in Countering Terrorism Financing:** Despite efforts by national governments and international bodies like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the United Nations, disrupting terrorist financing in the region remains a significant challenge. These challenges include: * **Cash-Based Economies:** The prevalence of informal, cash-based economies makes tracking illicit financial flows difficult. * **Porous Borders:** Weak border security facilitates the movement of cash, goods, and individuals involved in illicit activities. * **Difficult Terrain and Ungoverned Spaces:** Large, remote, and often ungoverned or poorly governed areas provide safe havens for extremist groups to operate and generate funds. * **Difficulties in Prosecution:** Even when financiers are identified, securing convictions can be challenging due to legal and evidentiary hurdles. * **Adaptability of Terrorist Groups:** Extremist groups continually adapt their financing methods to circumvent counter-terrorism measures. **State Sponsors:** While specific states are not consistently and publicly named by international bodies as direct, ongoing sponsors of Islamic extremist groups in Nigeria and West Africa in the same vein as global state sponsorship designations, the complex geopolitical landscape means external influences and historic interventions (like the situation in Libya) are sometimes cited as contributing factors to regional instability that extremist groups exploit. The primary identified external financial support comes from transnational terrorist organizations like ISIS and networks of individuals, rather than direct state sponsorship in most public accounts. In conclusion, the financing of Islamic extremism in Nigeria and West Africa is a multifaceted issue, deeply intertwined with local criminal economies, regional instability, and international extremist networks. Efforts to counter this require a comprehensive approach that addresses both the local drivers of funding and the transnational financial flows supporting these groups.
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  • Unboxing things that shouldn't be unboxed:-
    In Nigeria and some west African countries there has been real internal wars with killings every week but rarely hear the US, Britain and EU make a serious comment about it.

    NOW:
    Why Sudan's conflict matters to the rest of the world.
    Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan, head of the armed forces, and Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces that grew out of Darfur’s notorious Janjaweed militias, are each seeking to seize control of Sudan.

    US, Britain and EU are busy talking...Nigeria can you see that you're alone in this.
    You either "Fix it or Soon Nigeria will be like Libya.
    Unboxing things that shouldn't be unboxed:- In Nigeria and some west African countries there has been real internal wars with killings every week but rarely hear the US, Britain and EU make a serious comment about it. NOW: Why Sudan's conflict matters to the rest of the world. Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan, head of the armed forces, and Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces that grew out of Darfur’s notorious Janjaweed militias, are each seeking to seize control of Sudan. US, Britain and EU are busy talking...Nigeria can you see that you're alone in this. You either "Fix it or Soon Nigeria will be like Libya.
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